Court Dismisses Petition, Upholds Rules, Rejects Bias Claims

The court dismissed the petition due to significant delay in filing, upheld the validity of Rules 9 and 12, rejected claims of bias in appointing retired officers as special counsels, and declined the need for specific guidelines regulating their conduct. The court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality and the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate a clear violation of constitutional principles. The petition was found to lack merit, leading to its dismissal without costs being awarded.

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Issues Involved:
1. Delay and laches in filing the petition.
2. Validity of Rule 9 of the Customs (Appeals) Rules, 1982 and Rule 12 of the Central Excise (Appeals) Rules, 2001.
3. Qualifications and appointment of special counsels.
4. Alleged bias and prejudice in appointing retired officers as special counsels.
5. Requirement for guidelines to regulate the conduct of special counsels.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Delay and Laches in Filing the Petition:
The court noted that the petition was presented eight years after the issuance of the impugned endorsement, Annexure-B, dated 29.08.2006. Due to this inordinate delay and laches, the petition was liable to be rejected at the threshold.

2. Validity of Rule 9 of the Customs (Appeals) Rules, 1982 and Rule 12 of the Central Excise (Appeals) Rules, 2001:
The petitioner contended that Rule 9 and Rule 12 were ultra vires the Customs Act, 1962, and the Central Excise Act, 1944, respectively. The court found this argument to be specious. It was noted that both statutes permit legal practitioners to appear as "Authorized Representatives," thus the petitioner could not have any grievance. The court emphasized that a person enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates' Act, 1961, does not have an automatic right to practice in all courts unless Section 30 of that Act is brought into force.

3. Qualifications and Appointment of Special Counsels:
The petitioner argued that the endorsement did not specify educational qualifications for special counsels, which was contrary to the observations in the Madras Bar Association case. The court noted that the terms and conditions for engaging retired officials as special counsels were based on their experience in dealing with indirect taxation matters. It was further clarified that CESTAT hears appeals involving both questions of law and fact, and not solely "substantial questions of law."

4. Alleged Bias and Prejudice in Appointing Retired Officers as Special Counsels:
The petitioner argued that appointing retired officers as special counsels could create an apprehension of bias, especially if they appeared before their juniors. The court rejected this argument, referencing the Supreme Court's observations in N.K. Bajpai's case, which dealt with similar concerns. The court concluded that the possibility of bias must be shown to be present, and mere suspicion of bias is insufficient for further examination of the action.

5. Requirement for Guidelines to Regulate the Conduct of Special Counsels:
The petitioner requested the framing of guidelines to regulate the conduct of special counsels, similar to those framed by the Supreme Court in C. Venkatachalam's case. The court found that the decision in C. Venkatachalam's case, which dealt with non-advocates appearing in disputes before Consumer Fora, did not apply to the present case. The court emphasized that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is on the petitioner to show a clear transgression of constitutional principles.

Conclusion:
The court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. No order as to costs was made.

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