Probationary discharge of a judicial member was held stigmatic and punitive, invalid for arbitrariness and colourable exercise of power.

Rule 8 permitted discharge of a directly recruited Judicial Member during probation without reasons, and Rule 9(2) requiring one month's notice applied only after the prescribed probationary period had run without confirmation, so the notice safeguard was not a general probation rule. The discharge was nevertheless struck down because it was founded on adverse incident and complaint material, not a neutral assessment of suitability, and the record showed no prior communication of deficiencies before the confirmation process had been initiated. On those facts, the order was held stigmatic, punitive, arbitrary and a colourable exercise of power in breach of Article 14, and reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits followed.

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Issues: (i) whether, under the governing service rules, the termination of a directly recruited Judicial Member from the Bar required one month's notice only after completion of the prescribed probationary period and absence of confirmation; (ii) whether the discharge order was punitive, stigmatic and arbitrary so as to be vitiated by legal malice, colourable exercise of power and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): whether, under the governing service rules, the termination of a directly recruited Judicial Member from the Bar required one month's notice only after completion of the prescribed probationary period and absence of confirmation.

Analysis: Rule 8 governed probation and permitted discharge during probation without assigning reasons. Rule 9(2) applied to a Judicial Member directly recruited from the Bar only where the member had continued for three years or more without confirmation, in which event termination could be made only after one month's notice. The notice requirement under Rule 9(2) was therefore not attracted within the probationary period contemplated by Rule 8.

Conclusion: The notice requirement under Rule 9(2) was not applicable as a general probationary requirement; it applied only after the stipulated probationary period had run its course without confirmation.

Issue (ii): whether the discharge order was punitive, stigmatic and arbitrary so as to be vitiated by legal malice, colourable exercise of power and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The discharge was founded on the incident report and the complaint regarding the conduct of the member in court, and not on a neutral assessment of suitability alone. The record showed that the action was taken without prior communication of deficiencies and after the confirmation process had already been initiated. The order was treated as resting on allegations formed behind the member's back, making the alleged misconduct the foundation of the action. The timing of the extension of probation and the immediate discharge also showed an oblique attempt to avoid the notice safeguard. On these facts, the termination was held to be stigmatic, punitive, arbitrary and a colourable exercise of power, offending Article 14.

Conclusion: The discharge order was invalid and liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The challenge by the Union failed, while the member was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits, the termination having been found unlawful on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: A discharge of a probationary judicial member that is founded on adverse allegations forming the basis of the order, rather than on a simple assessment of suitability, is stigmatic and punitive and cannot stand unless the affected person is afforded an opportunity to meet those allegations.

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