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Issues: (i) whether an appeal against a final decision or order of the Armed Forces Tribunal lies to the Supreme Court as an absolute right under Section 30, or only subject to Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; (ii) whether a party may directly approach the Supreme Court for leave to appeal without first seeking a certificate or leave from the Tribunal under Section 31.
Issue (i): whether an appeal against a final decision or order of the Armed Forces Tribunal lies to the Supreme Court as an absolute right under Section 30, or only subject to Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.
Analysis: Section 30 begins with the words "subject to the provisions of Section 31", which makes the appellate remedy under Section 30(1) subordinate to Section 31. The statute draws a clear distinction between appeals as of right, which are confined to contempt orders under Section 30(2), and appeals against final orders or decisions, which are available only in accordance with Section 31. A conjoint reading of the two provisions shows that there is no vested or indefeasible right of appeal against final orders of the Tribunal except in the limited class expressly made appealable as of right.
Conclusion: There is no absolute right of appeal under Section 30(1); appeals against final orders lie only subject to Section 31, except contempt orders under Section 30(2).
Issue (ii): whether a party may directly approach the Supreme Court for leave to appeal without first seeking a certificate or leave from the Tribunal under Section 31.
Analysis: Section 31 contemplates a structured procedure. The first route is a certificate of fitness from the Tribunal, and only if that is refused may the party approach the Supreme Court for leave. The time limits in Section 31(2) also show that an application to the Supreme Court arises only after refusal by the Tribunal. The scheme therefore does not permit a direct application to the Supreme Court bypassing the Tribunal.
Conclusion: Direct recourse to the Supreme Court without first approaching the Tribunal is impermissible under Section 31.
Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme makes the Tribunal-certificate route or the Supreme Court-leave route mandatory for appeals against final orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and the appeals were accordingly not maintainable in the form presented.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellate provision is made expressly subject to another provision, the subordinate provision cannot be invoked as an independent right of appeal, and the prescribed procedural sequence must be followed before the Supreme Court can entertain the appeal.