Vested appellate rights under a later Sikh Gurdwaras statute were preserved, and pending appeals remained within High Court jurisdiction.

A later statute and a notification declaring a Gurdwara to be a Notified Sikh Gurdwara did not, without clear words or necessary implication, extinguish a vested right of appeal arising from a suit instituted earlier. The High Court therefore retained jurisdiction over the pending appeal, although it could not reopen matters conclusively settled by the statutory status of the Gurdwara under Section 3(4). Sections 29 and 32 were construed as governing original suits or proceedings, not appeals, so they did not require pending appeals to be sent to the Tribunal or otherwise oust appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal procedure was confined to first-instance matters.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 and the notification declaring the Gurdwara to be a Notified Sikh Gurdwara barred the High Court from entertaining and deciding a pending appeal arising out of a decree under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. (ii) Whether Sections 29 and 32 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 applied to and governed such pending appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 and the notification declaring the Gurdwara to be a Notified Sikh Gurdwara barred the High Court from entertaining and deciding a pending appeal arising out of a decree under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Analysis: The right of appeal was treated as a vested right accruing when the suit was instituted, and a later statute was not to be construed as taking away that right unless such intention was expressed clearly or arose by necessary implication. Section 3(4) made the notified status of the Gurdwara conclusive and placed its future management within the statutory scheme, so the Court could not reopen the questions whether the institution was a Sikh Gurdwara or whether a management scheme could be settled. Even so, that provision did not extinguish the appellate jurisdiction over the pending appeal as a whole.

Conclusion: The High Court retained jurisdiction to hear and decide the pending appeal, though it could not grant reliefs barred by the imperative effect of Section 3(4).

Issue (ii): Whether Sections 29 and 32 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 applied to and governed such pending appeals.

Analysis: The phrases "suit" and "proceeding" in Sections 29 and 32 were construed in their context as referring to original proceedings in a court of first instance and not to appeals. The Act did not expressly mention appeals, and applying those sections to pending appeals would produce anomalous consequences, including the High Court acting merely as a conduit for the Tribunal rather than as an appellate court. In the absence of clear words, the provisions were not read as ousting appellate jurisdiction or compelling reference of issues from pending appeals to the Tribunal.

Conclusion: Sections 29 and 32 did not apply to pending appeals and did not bar the High Court from deciding them.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that the High Court must proceed with the pending appeals, subject to the statutory limitations flowing from Section 3(4), and that the Tribunal procedure under Section 32 was confined to original proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A statute affecting vested appellate rights will not be construed to divest the appellate court of jurisdiction in pending appeals unless the legislative intention is expressed clearly or by necessary implication, and general references to "suit" or "proceeding" will not be extended to appeals where the context shows a narrower meaning.

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