Commission of Inquiry power depends on definite public importance; vague Schedule items were quashed as not validly referable.

The High Court held that territorial jurisdiction existed and the petition was maintainable despite objections based on delay, acquiescence and procedural bars. It accepted substantial compliance with constitutional requirements for authentication and expression in the President's name, so the notification appointing the Commission was not invalid on that ground. Failure of earlier parliamentary resolutions did not disable the Government from exercising its separate discretionary power under the Commissions of Inquiry Act. However, the Court held that Section 3 applies only to a definite matter of public importance, and the Schedule 'C' items were too vague and unsupported by bona fide material; they were therefore not validly referable and were quashed, with prohibition against inquiry into those items.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction and the petition was maintainable despite the preliminary objections of delay, acquiescence and alleged alternate procedural bars; (ii) whether the notification appointing the Commission of Inquiry was invalid for want of compliance with constitutional requirements of authentication and expression in the name of the President; (iii) whether the fact that resolutions to appoint a Commission had earlier failed in Parliament disabled the Government from acting under its discretionary power under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952; (iv) whether the items in Schedule 'C' were definite matters of public importance and whether the Government had formed a bona fide opinion on relevant materials so as to justify the inquiry.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction and the petition was maintainable despite the preliminary objections of delay, acquiescence and alleged alternate procedural bars.

Analysis: Part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction through the Commission's regional office and requisitions exchanged at Calcutta. The challenge went to the very jurisdiction of the Commission, so the proceedings themselves could constitute substantial injury. Delay was not fatal where a writ of prohibition was sought against an allegedly void proceeding. Mere compliance with requisitions did not amount to waiver of a jurisdictional objection.

Conclusion: The preliminary objections failed and the petition was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the notification appointing the Commission of Inquiry was invalid for want of compliance with constitutional requirements of authentication and expression in the name of the President.

Analysis: The notification was challenged on the footing that it was not expressed in the name of the President and was not properly authenticated. The counter-affidavit asserted compliance with Article 77 and relied on the authority of the Secretary to authenticate such instruments. The Court accepted that substantial compliance with the constitutional formalities was sufficient and that the claimed Cabinet material was protected as affairs of State.

Conclusion: The notification was not invalid on this ground.

Issue (iii): Whether the fact that resolutions to appoint a Commission had earlier failed in Parliament disabled the Government from acting under its discretionary power under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952.

Analysis: The statutory scheme was treated as containing two distinct sources of power: a mandatory power arising from a legislative resolution and a discretionary power exercisable by the Government on its own assessment. Failure of a resolution in Parliament did not create a bar against the Government exercising the separate discretionary source of power. Article 122 was held inapplicable because no irregularity in parliamentary procedure was under challenge.

Conclusion: The earlier defeat of resolutions in Parliament did not fetter the Government's power under Section 3.

Issue (iv): Whether the items in Schedule 'C' were definite matters of public importance and whether the Government had formed a bona fide opinion on relevant materials so as to justify the inquiry.

Analysis: The Court held that the power under Section 3 is confined to definite matters of public importance and that the existence of such matters is justiciable. Applying that standard, the Court found the impugned items in Schedule 'C' to be vague and general, lacking sufficient specificity and failing to disclose a definite matter of public importance. The materials placed did not justify a bona fide opinion that the listed items required a Commission of Inquiry. The reasoning distinguished cases where specific charges or clearly identified public issues supported the reference. Because the statutory condition precedent was not satisfied, the Commission had no jurisdiction to inquire into those items.

Conclusion: The impugned items in Schedule 'C' were not validly referable to the Commission and were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded in respect of the impugned Schedule 'C' items, and a writ of prohibition issued restraining inquiry into those items while leaving the Commission free to proceed with the remaining matters in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a Commission can be appointed only where the subject-matter is a definite matter of public importance, and the existence of that condition is subject to judicial review on the basis of relevant, bona fide materials.

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