1978 (9) TMI 187 - HC - Indian Laws

Court asserts territorial jurisdiction under Article 226, bars delay in seeking writ, and limits jurisdiction by quashing specific items.

Orient Paper Mills Versus Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

The court held that it had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Article 226 of the Constitution as part of the cause of action ... - Issues Involved:1. Territorial Jurisdiction2. Violation of Fundamental Rights3. Delay in Filing the Petition4. Submission to the Jurisdiction of the Commission5. Validity of the Notification under Article 776. Discretionary Power of the Government under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act7. Definite Matters of Public Importance8. Mala Fide and Extraneous ConsiderationsIssue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Territorial Jurisdiction:The respondents contended that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction as no part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The petitioner's registered office was in Orissa, and the notification was published in Delhi. However, the petitioner argued that the Commission had a regional office in Calcutta, and requisitions were made from this office to the petitioner's Calcutta office. The court held that part of the cause of action did arise within its jurisdiction, thus it had the authority to entertain the application under Article 226 of the Constitution.2. Violation of Fundamental Rights:The respondents argued that the petition did not fall under Clauses (a), (b), or (c) of Article 226(1) of the Constitution, claiming no violation of fundamental rights or substantial injury. However, the court found that if the entire proceeding was without jurisdiction, subjecting the petitioner to such a proceeding itself constituted substantial injury. The court referenced its own decision in Gulab Kanwar v. Enforcement Officer, stating it would be unjust to compel the petitioner to appear before authorities in void proceedings.3. Delay in Filing the Petition:The respondents contended there was an inordinate delay in filing the petition, as the notification was issued in February 1970, and the petition was filed in May 1974. The court held that delay is not a bar when a writ of prohibition is sought for lack of jurisdiction. The court referenced Sheo Nath Singh v. Appellate Asst. Commr. of Income Tax, where a delay of five years was not considered a bar to relief.4. Submission to the Jurisdiction of the Commission:The respondents argued that the petitioner had submitted to the Commission's jurisdiction by complying with its requisitions. The court held that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner's challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction was valid, and their compliance with requisitions did not bar them from seeking relief.5. Validity of the Notification under Article 77:The petitioner contended that the notification was void as it was not expressed in the name of the President of India as required by Article 77(1) and was not authenticated as specified under Article 77(2). The court found that the requirements of Article 77(1) and (2) are directory and not mandatory, and substantial compliance was sufficient. The court noted that the notification was signed by the Secretary to the Government of India, who was authorized to authenticate it.6. Discretionary Power of the Government under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act:The petitioner argued that the government's discretionary power under Section 3 could not be exercised contrary to Parliament's decision, as resolutions for appointing a Commission were defeated in both houses of Parliament. The court held that the discretionary power to appoint a Commission is not fettered by the loss of a resolution in Parliament. The two parts of Section 3 are mutually exclusive, and the government can still exercise its discretionary power.7. Definite Matters of Public Importance:The petitioner contended that the matters in Schedule 'C' were not definite matters of public importance and that the conditions precedent for exercising powers under Section 3(1) were not fulfilled. The court found that the items in Schedule 'C' were vague and indefinite, lacking specificity and relevance. The court referenced the principles laid down in Dalmia's case and other judgments, emphasizing that the subject matter must be definite and of public importance.8. Mala Fide and Extraneous Considerations:The petitioner argued that the items in Schedule 'C' were included mala fide and on extraneous considerations, to placate political factions. The court did not find it necessary to decide on mala fide, as it had already determined that the conditions precedent for exercising powers under Section 3 were not fulfilled.Conclusion:The court quashed items 2, 4, 9, 11, 12, and 13 of Schedule 'C' to the notification, issuing a writ of prohibition against the Commission of Inquiry from inquiring into these items. However, the Commission was allowed to proceed with other matters in the notification in accordance with the law. No order as to costs was made.