Prima facie review under POTA is limited, and hazardous weapon possession can still sustain proceedings despite Section 4(a) failing.

Unauthorized possession of hazardous explosive substances or lethal weapons capable of mass destruction can attract Section 4(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 even where Section 4(a) is inapplicable because the notified area requirement is not met. The Review Committee's role under Section 60 is confined to a prima facie assessment and it cannot weigh the sufficiency of evidence or decide guilt on merits. Where a prosecutable case exists, withdrawal of the proceedings is not sustainable, and a transfer of the criminal cases outside the State may be ordered where the circumstances create a real apprehension of unfair trial.

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Issues: (i) whether the Review Committee could confine itself only to Section 4(a) and ignore the applicability of Section 4(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002; (ii) whether the Committee could go beyond the limited prima facie enquiry under Section 60 of the Act and assess sufficiency of evidence against the accused; (iii) whether the State Government's withdrawal of the POTA cases and the public prosecutor's withdrawal application could be sustained; (iv) whether the criminal cases should be transferred outside the State in the interest of fair trial.

Issue (i): whether the Review Committee could confine itself only to Section 4(a) and ignore the applicability of Section 4(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 4(a) applies only where unauthorized possession of the specified arms or ammunition occurs in a notified area. The notification declaring the whole State to be a notified area became effective only on publication, which was after the raid and recovery. That aspect could not sustain a charge under Section 4(a). Section 4(b), however, is materially different. It covers unauthorized possession of bombs, dynamite, hazardous explosive substances, and other lethal weapons capable of mass destruction, irrespective of whether the area is notified. The possession of explosive material and an AK-56 rifle was therefore capable of attracting Section 4(b). The two clauses are not mutually exclusive and must be read harmoniously.

Conclusion: The finding against Section 4(a) could not stand, but the material did sustain proceedings under Section 4(b).

Issue (ii): whether the Committee could go beyond the limited prima facie enquiry under Section 60 of the Act and assess sufficiency of evidence against the accused.

Analysis: The statutory function under Section 60 is confined to seeing whether a prima facie case exists for proceeding under the Act. The Committee could not conduct a merits-based evaluation, weigh the sufficiency of evidence, or decide whether the accused were ultimately connected to the recovery in a manner that would justify conviction. Its enquiry had gone beyond the statutory limit.

Conclusion: The Committee exceeded its jurisdiction in treating the matter as if it were deciding guilt on merits.

Issue (iii): whether the State Government's withdrawal of the POTA cases and the public prosecutor's withdrawal application could be sustained.

Analysis: Once a prima facie case was found under Section 4(b) and allied provisions, the withdrawal of the prosecution could not be approved. A public prosecutor must apply an independent judicial mind before seeking withdrawal, and the court is not bound to accept such a request. In the present matter, the withdrawal was inconsistent with the existence of a prosecutable case.

Conclusion: The withdrawal order and the withdrawal application were not sustainable.

Issue (iv): whether the criminal cases should be transferred outside the State in the interest of fair trial.

Analysis: The circumstances disclosed apprehension of miscarriage of justice, including the atmosphere in which the cases were pending and the nature of the allegations regarding intimidation of witnesses. On that basis, transfer of the cases was considered necessary to secure a fair trial.

Conclusion: The transfer of the cases was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were sustained only to the extent of Section 4(b) and the related prosecutable offences, the withdrawal of the cases was rejected, and the connected matters were ordered to be tried before a transferee court to ensure fairness.

Ratio Decidendi: Unauthorized possession of hazardous explosive substances or lethal weapons capable of mass destruction can attract Section 4(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 even if Section 4(a) is inapplicable, and a Review Committee under Section 60 may decide only the existence of a prima facie case.

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