Criminal negligence in rash driving cases requires proof beyond reasonable doubt; res ipsa loquitur cannot shift the burden to the accused.

Hostile prosecution witnesses are not to be rejected wholesale if parts of their evidence remain trustworthy, and the court may rely on the credible portion. In criminal prosecution for rash or negligent driving, res ipsa loquitur cannot shift the burden from the prosecution to the accused; it may only assist in drawing inferences from proved facts. Applying that standard, the circumstances showed a sudden road entry by the child, an attempted swerve to avoid impact, and an instantaneous error of judgment rather than culpable negligence. The prosecution therefore failed to prove rash or negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction was set aside.

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Issues: (i) whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses treated as hostile was liable to be rejected in toto; (ii) whether the maxim res ipsa loquitur could be invoked in a criminal prosecution for rash or negligent driving; (iii) whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death by rash or negligent driving.

Issue (i): Whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses treated as hostile was liable to be rejected in toto.

Analysis: A prosecution witness who is cross-examined by the party calling him is not washed off the record altogether. If his credit is not completely destroyed, the court may accept the part of his evidence that remains trustworthy. Here, the witnesses were not effectively contradicted on the material facts forming the substratum of their version, including the slow speed of the bus, the sudden appearance of the child, and the effort made by the driver to avoid the collision.

Conclusion: The hostile witnesses' evidence could not be rejected wholesale, and the courts below were not justified in discarding it in toto.

Issue (ii): Whether the maxim res ipsa loquitur could be invoked in a criminal prosecution for rash or negligent driving.

Analysis: The maxim is primarily a principle of the law of torts and, in criminal law, cannot be used to shift the burden of proving guilt from the prosecution to the accused. In a criminal trial, the prosecution must prove every essential ingredient beyond reasonable doubt. At most, the maxim may assist as a permissive aid in drawing inferences from proved facts under the law of evidence, but only where the circumstances unmistakably point to negligence and exclude reasonable alternative explanations.

Conclusion: Res ipsa loquitur could not be applied as a rule to presume criminal negligence against the appellant in the facts of the case.

Issue (iii): Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death by rash or negligent driving.

Analysis: The proved facts showed that the child suddenly entered the road, the driver swerved the vehicle in an attempt to avoid her, and further swerving would have exposed the passengers to grave danger from the deep ditch on the other side. The accident was consistent with an instantaneous error of judgment made in a split second, not with culpable negligence or rashness. The circumstances did not form an unbroken chain incompatible with innocence.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove rash or negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was set aside and the appellant stood acquitted because the incident disclosed, at most, an error of judgment and not criminal negligence.

Ratio Decidendi: In criminal cases, res ipsa loquitur cannot shift the burden of proof to the accused, and a conviction for rash or negligent driving can be sustained only when the prosecution proves culpable negligence beyond reasonable doubt from firmly established circumstances that exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

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