Evacuee property revision and appeal rights: later legislation displaced the earlier appeal route and barred certiorari reappraisal.

Where later evacuee property legislation substituted a comprehensive statutory scheme, proceedings begun under the earlier Mysore enactment were treated as proceedings under the later law, so the Custodian-General could revise the Custodian's order under section 27. The revisional power was wide enough to test legality and propriety, and the original statutory source did not confine it. A prior High Court appeal right was displaced by the later scheme by necessary intendment, so no appeal lay from the Custodian's later order. Certiorari under article 226 was unavailable to reappraise facts or correct non-jurisdictional error. The Custodian-General's revisional order was upheld and the Custodian's order restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Custodian-General had jurisdiction under section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 to revise the Custodian's order dated 22 August 1950. (ii) Whether an appeal lay to the High Court from the Custodian's order dated 2 December 1952, and whether that order could be quashed in writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether the Custodian-General had jurisdiction under section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 to revise the Custodian's order dated 22 August 1950.

Analysis: The revisional power under section 27 was expressed in wide terms, empowering the Custodian-General to call for the record of any proceeding in which a Custodian had passed an order and to satisfy himself as to its legality or propriety. The earlier Mysore enactments were displaced by the later statutory regime, and proceedings begun under section 8 of the first Mysore Act were treated, by the saving and repealing provisions, as proceedings under the corresponding provisions of the later Acts. The fact that the original proceedings had started under the first Mysore Act did not restrict the Custodian-General's statutory revisional power once the later Act held the field.

Conclusion: The Custodian-General had jurisdiction to revise the order dated 22 August 1950, and his order dated 11 February 1952 was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal lay to the High Court from the Custodian's order dated 2 December 1952, and whether that order could be quashed in writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The right of appeal is a vested substantive right, but it may be taken away by express provision or necessary intendment. Although the first Mysore Act originally provided an appeal to the High Court, the later statutory scheme substituted a different appellate forum and a different procedure for the same class of matters. The proceedings under the old Act were substantially equivalent to proceedings under the later enactments, so the subsequent legislation necessarily displaced the old appellate route. In writ jurisdiction, certiorari was not available to reappraise findings of fact or to interfere merely because a different view of the merits was possible; interference was justified only for jurisdictional error or a manifest error apparent on the face of the record.

Conclusion: No appeal lay to the High Court, and there was no basis for interference under article 226.

Final Conclusion: The Custodian-General's revisional order was within jurisdiction, the High Court wrongly entertained the matter as an appeal and by writ, and the Custodian's order dated 2 December 1952 was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Where later legislation substitutes a comprehensive statutory scheme for evacuee property matters, proceedings initiated under an earlier repealed enactment are treated as proceedings under the later law, and the appellate and revisional remedies provided by the later law supersede the earlier appeal right by necessary intendment; certiorari cannot be used to reassess facts or correct non-jurisdictional errors.

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