Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether a winding up petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 is barred by sections 17, 18 and 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Companies Act treats winding up on inability to pay debts as a distinct remedy, and the Court reiterated that such proceedings are not merely for recovery of money but also involve consideration of commercial insolvency and public interest. The 1993 Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Debt Recovery Tribunal for adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions, but section 34 operates only where there is inconsistency. Reading both enactments together, the Court found that a winding up petition does not stand on the same footing as an ordinary debt recovery action and therefore does not conflict with the jurisdiction created by the 1993 Act.
Conclusion: The Company Court's jurisdiction to entertain the winding up petition was not ousted, and the appeal failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A winding up petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 is not a mere debt recovery proceeding, and therefore the overriding clause in section 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 does not bar the Company Court from entertaining such a petition where the two enactments can operate harmoniously.