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Issues: (i) Whether the conviction under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 could be sustained on the evidence adduced. (ii) Whether the charge under Section 3(5) and conviction under Section 3(2)(i) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 were legally sustainable, including the adequacy of the Section 313 examination.
Issue (i): Whether the conviction under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 could be sustained on the evidence adduced.
Analysis: The prosecution case rested on circumstantial material. The witnesses relied upon were either hostile, not material, or did not connect the appellant with the alleged kidnapping and killing. The evidence did not establish the appellant's involvement in the occurrence, and the material on record did not prove the prosecution case beyond doubt.
Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained, and this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the charge under Section 3(5) and conviction under Section 3(2)(i) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 were legally sustainable, including the adequacy of the Section 313 examination.
Analysis: Section 3(5) had not come into force on the date of the alleged , so a charge under that provision was inherently defective. Section 3(2)(i) had to be read with Section 3(1), which requires the requisite terrorist intention, and that ingredient was neither reflected in the charge nor proved in evidence. The examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was also unfair, as the accused was questioned on a basis not supported by the evidence. The Court also reiterated that Designated Courts must apply strict scrutiny before framing charge and before recording conviction under the special statute.
Conclusion: The charge and conviction under the special statute were unsustainable, and this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The judgment of conviction was set aside because the evidence failed to connect the appellant with the offence and the special statutory charges were legally unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A conviction under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 can stand only when the prosecution proves, on legally admissible evidence, that the case falls strictly within the statutory ingredients, including the requisite terrorist intention, and the Designated Court has applied careful judicial scrutiny at the stages of charge and conviction.