Conspiracy evidence limited to acts during the conspiracy, while later transactions may still prove sham dealings and guilty intention.

In a conspiracy prosecution, acts, writings and statements of co-conspirators are admissible against other accused only while the conspiracy is on foot and in furtherance of the common design; later conduct cannot be treated as proof of the conspiracy itself. Later transactions may still be relevant where they directly show the sham character of earlier dealings and the individual accused's guilty intention. The Court also found no material prejudice from the evidentiary and charge objections raised, and held that the evidence as a whole supported the convictions, which were left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) whether acts, writings and statements of co-conspirators occurring after the charged period of conspiracy were admissible to prove the conspiracy and participation in it; (ii) whether the surrounding evidence relating to later transactions was admissible as relevant evidence to show the bogus character of the January 1949 transactions and the criminal intention of the accused; and (iii) whether the alleged evidentiary and charge-related objections vitiated the convictions.

Issue (i): whether acts, writings and statements of co-conspirators occurring after the charged period of conspiracy were admissible to prove the conspiracy and participation in it.

Analysis: The rule governing conspiracy evidence is confined to things said, done or written while the conspiracy is on foot and in furtherance of the common design. Evidence outside the charged period cannot be used against other accused as if it were an act or statement of the conspiracy itself. The principle of admissibility under the conspiracy rule is not enlarged by treating later conduct of one conspirator as proof against others on a theory of agency beyond the period of the conspiracy.

Conclusion: Such post-conspiracy material was not admissible to prove the conspiracy or the participation of the other accused as such.

Issue (ii): whether the surrounding evidence relating to later transactions was admissible as relevant evidence to show the bogus character of the January 1949 transactions and the criminal intention of the accused.

Analysis: Evidence of later transactions may still be admissible if it directly bears on a substantive issue in the case, such as whether the original loans and payments were genuine or sham and whether the individual accused acted with guilty intention. The later manipulations in 1949 and 1950 were treated as links in the chain of proof showing the fictitious nature of the earlier transactions and as conduct relevant to rebut the defence of innocent participation. The evidentiary value was therefore confined to those purposes and not to proving conspiracy by attribution of later conduct to all accused.

Conclusion: The later transactions were admissible for the limited purposes of proving falsity of the original transactions and the individual accused's criminal intention.

Issue (iii): whether the alleged evidentiary and charge-related objections vitiated the convictions.

Analysis: The Court found no material prejudice from the non-examination of the handwriting expert or certain transferees, no impermissible use of inconsistent cases, and no fatal misdirection in the charge to the jury. The evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and the convictions could not be interfered with in special leave merely because the record was voluminous or complex.

Conclusion: The objections did not undermine the convictions.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed and the convictions and sentences were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a conspiracy prosecution, evidence of a co-conspirator's acts or statements is admissible against others only while the conspiracy is in progress and in furtherance of its common design, though later conduct may still be relevant for proving the falsity of transactions or the individual accused's guilty intention.

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