Plain language of retention clause prevents adding a khas possession ; intermediary's retention claim was sustained.

Section 6(1)(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 allows retention of land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures without any express requirement of khas possession, so that condition cannot be read into the provision. The plain statutory language governs, and the intermediary's right of retention was available on that basis. In writ proceedings, filing Form B amounted to acceptance of intermediary status, and the court was not justified in reopening questions of whether the predecessor was an intermediary or whether the land had vested in the State. The challenge to the retention claim therefore failed.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the intermediary could retain the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures under section 6(1)(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 without being in khas possession of the land; (ii) whether, in the writ proceedings, it was necessary to re-examine the question whether the landholder was an intermediary at all and whether the land had vested in the State.

Issue (i): whether the intermediary could retain the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures under section 6(1)(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 without being in khas possession of the land.

Analysis: Section 6(1)(b) confers a right of retention in respect of land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures, whether erected by the intermediary or not. The provision does not mention khas possession as a condition for retention, unlike other clauses of section 6 where such a requirement is expressly stated. Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the natural meaning and cannot read in a condition which the legislature has omitted.

Conclusion: The requirement of khas possession could not be imported into section 6(1)(b), and the land was capable of retention by the intermediary.

Issue (ii): whether, in the writ proceedings, it was necessary to re-examine the question whether the landholder was an intermediary at all and whether the land had vested in the State.

Analysis: The filing of Form B to retain the land amounted to an acceptance of the status of intermediary under the Act. In that situation, the High Court was not justified in entering into an inquiry, in writ jurisdiction, into questions beyond the scope of the proceeding, including the status of the predecessor and the alleged vesting of the interest in the State.

Conclusion: The inquiry into non-intermediary status and non-vesting was unnecessary and should not have been undertaken.

Final Conclusion: The statutory right of retention under section 6(1)(b) was available on the language of the provision, and the challenge to the retention claim failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a retention clause in a vesting statute does not expressly require khas possession, courts cannot add that requirement by interpretation, and the plain text of the clause must govern the intermediary's right of retention.

---