Alternative remedy does not bar writ relief against a void order; tribunal may correct nullity, but necessary parties must be impleaded.

An alternative statutory remedy does not bar writ intervention where the impugned order is alleged and found to be a nullity, because a void order has no legal efficacy. On that basis, the writ was maintainable. A tribunal is also not rendered functus officio in relation to correcting or withdrawing a void order, since such an order is treated as no order in law. However, relief affecting mortgaged documents could not be granted without impleading the principal borrower and other directly affected persons, so the matter required remand for fresh consideration after joining all necessary parties.

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Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 when the impugned order was treated as null and void and non est in law; (ii) Whether the Tribunal became functus officio after recording such a finding and could still recall or modify its order; (iii) Whether the matter required remand for impleadment of the principal borrower and other affected parties before any direction for release of documents could be issued.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 when the impugned order was treated as null and void and non est in law.

Analysis: The availability of an alternative statutory remedy is ordinarily a bar to writ intervention, but the rule yields where the impugned order is attacked as one passed without jurisdiction or as a nullity. A void order carries no legal efficacy, and an appeal against such an order does not confer validity on it. On the facts found by the Tribunal, the decree and consequential proceedings were treated as non est in law, and that finding had not been challenged by the bank.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable, and the objection based on alternative remedy failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal became functus officio after recording such a finding and could still recall or modify its order.

Analysis: Where an order is void, ultra vires, or otherwise a nullity, the authority which passed it is not rendered powerless to correct the error merely because the matter was earlier disposed of. The power to withdraw or correct a null order survives, because such an order is treated as no order in the eye of law.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was not justified in refusing relief on the ground of functus officio.

Issue (iii): Whether the matter required remand for impleadment of the principal borrower and other affected parties before any direction for release of documents could be issued.

Analysis: The relief sought involved rights concerning the mortgaged document and could not properly be granted behind the back of the principal borrower and other persons whose interests were directly affected. Since they had not been impleaded before the Tribunal, a fresh adjudication with all necessary parties was required.

Conclusion: The matter had to be remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration after impleadment of the necessary parties.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was interfered with to the extent necessary, and the dispute was sent back for fresh decision after bringing all necessary parties on record.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court may entertain a challenge despite an alternative remedy where the impugned order is alleged and found to be a nullity, and an authority is not functus officio in relation to correcting a void order.

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