Land Acquisition references cannot be used to dispute pre-existing State title to land; such claims fall outside statutory jurisdiction.

Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is confined to disputes on apportionment or the persons entitled to compensation, and is discretionary with the Collector, while Section 18 is limited to specified objections and subject to strict limitation. Where the State asserts that the acquired land had already vested in it before acquisition, the dispute concerns the very competence of acquiring State-owned land, not apportionment of compensation. Such a claim falls outside Sections 18 and 30, so a reference based on pre-existing State title is beyond statutory jurisdiction and cannot be entertained by the Civil Court.

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Issues: Whether the State could invoke a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispute entitlement to compensation on the basis that the acquired land had already vested in the State before acquisition.

Analysis: The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 distinguishes a reference under Section 18 from one under Section 30. Section 18 is confined to a person interested who disputes matters such as measurement, compensation, persons entitled, or apportionment, and it is subject to a strict limitation period. Section 30, by contrast, is confined to disputes as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom compensation is payable, and it is discretionary with the Collector. The Act does not contemplate acquisition of land already owned by the State, because the State cannot acquire what already vests in it. Where the State asserts a pre-existing title in the land itself, that dispute is outside the scope of Sections 18 and 30. Such a question is not a dispute about apportionment of compensation among claimants or about who is entitled to compensation determined under the award, but a challenge to the very competence of acquisition proceedings in respect of State-owned land. A reference on that basis is beyond statutory jurisdiction, and the Civil Court cannot entertain it.

Conclusion: The State could not competently seek a reference under Section 30 on the footing of a pre-existing State title to the land, and the reference and all proceedings founded on it were without jurisdiction.

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