Limited statutory jurisdiction cannot replace acquisition procedure; unauthorised restoration of a notification and declaration was invalid.

A statutory power under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be exercised only within its limited scope: the Additional Commissioner could consider objections under Section 5A, but had no adjudicatory jurisdiction to cancel a Section 4 notification, restore acquisition proceedings, or direct a Section 6 declaration. The Land Acquisition Act procedure could not be displaced by treating the matter as an exercise of general revisional power under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, and action taken without statutory authority was ultra vires. Concurrent orders granting non-agricultural permission were also left undisturbed because no sustainable ground existed to upset them.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 to entertain the challenge, restore the Section 4 notification, and direct a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the orders granting non-agricultural permission for conversion of land.

Issue (i): Whether the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 to entertain the challenge, restore the Section 4 notification, and direct a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Analysis: The power under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is limited to considering objections and making a report; it does not confer adjudicatory authority to cancel a preliminary notification under Section 4. Proceedings taken by authorities under the Land Acquisition Act are governed by that Act and not by the appellate or revisional scheme of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. An order passed without statutory authority cannot be sustained by treating it as an exercise of general revenue jurisdiction, and a declaration under Section 6 could not validly be made once the Section 4 notification had been cancelled without following due process known to law.

Conclusion: The Additional Commissioner acted without jurisdiction, and the order restoring acquisition proceedings and the resulting Section 6 declaration were unsustainable in law.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the orders granting non-agricultural permission for conversion of land.

Analysis: The revenue authorities, including the Tehsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional Collector, and Additional Commissioner, had concurrently granted and upheld the non-agricultural permission. The High Court interfered only by following its earlier decision, which had itself been set aside. In the absence of any sustainable ground to upset the concurrent administrative orders, interference was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference with the orders granting non-agricultural permission was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals succeeded. The impugned High Court judgments were set aside, and the orders passed by the authorities below were restored to the extent indicated in the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers a limited, purpose-specific power on a designated authority, that authority cannot assume appellate or revisional jurisdiction or act beyond the statute; any order made without such authority is ultra vires and cannot be validated by reference to a different enactment.

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