Religious institution administration levy upheld as a fee, while executive scheme-making without judicial supervision was invalid.

Executive scheme-making for the administration of a religious institution, when made final without judicial supervision, was treated as going beyond regulation and as an unreasonable restriction on the property interest attached to the office; the scheme-making provisions were therefore invalid. The proviso that allowed the Commissioner to direct disposal of surplus income was also struck down because it imposed an unnecessary additional restriction on the trustee's discretion over expenditure already beneficial to the institution. By contrast, the annual contribution for the Commissioner's establishment was upheld as a fee, not a tax, because it funded secular administration through a special fund and involved quid pro quo; article 27 did not apply.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the provisions empowering the Commissioner to frame a scheme for the administration of a religious institution without judicial supervision imposed an unreasonable restriction on property rights and were invalid. (ii) Whether the proviso to the provision regulating the disposal of surplus income unduly curtailed the trustee's discretion and was invalid. (iii) Whether the annual contribution levied on maths and temples was a fee or a tax, and whether it was hit by the constitutional prohibition against appropriation for religious purposes.

Issue (i): Whether the provisions empowering the Commissioner to frame a scheme for the administration of a religious institution without judicial supervision imposed an unreasonable restriction on property rights and were invalid.

Analysis: The scheme-making power vested in an executive officer, without intervention of any judicial tribunal, was held to go beyond mere regulation of administration. Although the object was proper administration of endowed property, the absence of judicial supervision and the conferral of finality on the Commissioner's order were treated as an unreasonable restriction on the superior of the institution, whose property interest was blended with his office.

Conclusion: The provisions were invalid and struck down in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the proviso to the provision regulating the disposal of surplus income unduly curtailed the trustee's discretion and was invalid.

Analysis: The trustee's power over surplus income was recognized as wide, subject only to the normal limitation that it could not be used for personal purposes unconnected with the office. The proviso authorising further directions by the Commissioner was held to impose an unnecessary additional restriction on expenditure for purposes already beneficial to the institution.

Conclusion: The proviso was invalid in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the annual contribution levied on maths and temples was a fee or a tax, and whether it was hit by the constitutional prohibition against appropriation for religious purposes.

Analysis: The levy was imposed to meet the expenses of the Commissioner and his establishment, which formed the machinery for secular administration of the religious institutions. The collections were earmarked for a special fund and not merged in general revenue, so the element of quid pro quo was present. On that basis, the impost was treated as a fee and not a tax, and article 27 was held inapplicable because the levy was not for promoting or maintaining any particular religion or denomination.

Conclusion: The contribution was valid, being a fee within legislative competence and not prohibited by article 27, against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part: the scheme-making provisions and the proviso regulating surplus expenditure were held invalid, while the levy for the administration fund was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A levy earmarked for the secular administration of religious institutions, supported by a special fund and bearing the element of quid pro quo, is a fee and not a tax; and executive scheme-making that displaces judicial supervision may be invalid as an unreasonable restriction on property rights.

---