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Issues: (i) whether the bar contained in sections 3(4) and 16 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 excluded the civil court's jurisdiction to examine the validity of the permission granted under section 3; (ii) whether the Commissioner's permission under section 3(3) was invalid as being without jurisdiction and a nullity.
Issue (i): whether the bar contained in sections 3(4) and 16 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 excluded the civil court's jurisdiction to examine the validity of the permission granted under section 3.
Analysis: Section 16 expressly provided that orders made under the Act shall not be called in question in any court, and section 3(4) made the Commissioner's order final subject to the State Government's power under section 7-F. The statutory scheme therefore excluded civil court scrutiny of the correctness or propriety of such orders. At the same time, the bar could not extend to a plea that the impugned order was a legal nullity, because such a plea goes to the root of the matter and is not merely a challenge to merits. Orders made in defiance of mandatory requirements, without jurisdiction, or in breach of fundamental principles of judicial procedure or natural justice were treated as open to challenge notwithstanding the exclusion clause.
Conclusion: the civil court's jurisdiction was barred as regards merits, correctness, or propriety, but not where the challenge was that the order was a nullity in law.
Issue (ii): whether the Commissioner's permission under section 3(3) was invalid as being without jurisdiction and a nullity.
Analysis: Section 3(3) conferred revisional power on the Commissioner to confirm or set aside the District Magistrate's order if the District Magistrate had acted illegally, with material irregularity, or had wrongly refused to act. The provision did not confine the Commissioner's power to jurisdictional errors alone. The statutory language was wide, and the later amendment of 1954 made the width of that power even more explicit. The High Court had wrongly read into section 3(3) a limitation derived from section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though the two provisions were materially different in language and scope.
Conclusion: the Commissioner's permission was not jurisdiction and was not a nullity; it was validly granted under section 3(3).
Final Conclusion: the appeal succeeded, the High Court's order was set aside, and the decree in favour of the landlords was restored.
Ratio Decidendi: where a special statute excludes civil court scrutiny of orders made under it, the bar does not prevent a challenge that the order is a legal nullity, but a revisional power expressed in wide terms cannot be narrowed by importing limitations not found in the statutory text.
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