2004 (5) TMI 584 - SC - Indian Laws

Maharashtra Can Amend Development Control Rules: SC Overturns High Court's Order, Dismisses Writ Petitions.

The SC determined that the State Government of Maharashtra possesses the delegated legislative authority to amend the Development Control Rules under the ... Delegated legislation to State Government under section 37(2) - scope of inquiry and power to sanction with modifications - absence of requirement for hearing or application of principles of natural justice in subordinate/legislative sanction - promissory estoppel not available against statute or statutory rules - judicial review limited to arbitrariness or unreasonablenessDelegated legislation to State Government under section 37(2) - scope of inquiry and power to sanction with modifications - Validity of additions and modifications made by the State Government to the Planning Authority's proposed amendments to the Development Control Rules under section 37(2) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. - HELD THAT: - Section 37(1) requires the Planning Authority to invite objections, hear affected persons and submit proposed modifications to the State Government. Under section 37(2) the State Government is empowered, as a repository of delegated legislative power, to make such inquiry as it considers necessary and to sanction the modification 'with or without such changes, and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, or refuse to accord sanction.' The legislature intended to confer a wide discretion on the Government to alter or impose conditions when granting sanction to modifications; such action is an exercise of legislative function. The Government's power to make changes in the modification submitted by the Planning Authority therefore falls within the textual scope of section 37(2). Intervention by courts is limited to instances where the exercise of that power is arbitrary or unreasonable, which was not established by the respondents in this case.The State Government was competent under section 37(2) to make the additions and impose conditions while sanctioning the modification; the High Court's contrary conclusion is unsustainable.Absence of requirement for hearing or application of principles of natural justice in subordinate/legislative sanction - judicial review limited to arbitrariness or unreasonableness - Whether the State Government was obliged to afford a fresh hearing to affected persons before sanctioning the modification under section 37(2). - HELD THAT: - The procedure for amendment is contained in section 37, which prescribes the Planning Authority's duty to invite objections and hear affected persons before submitting the proposal. Section 37(2) does not require the State Government to hold a public hearing prior to sanctioning the modification. A provision enabling the Government to make 'such inquiry as it may consider necessary' is an enabling provision to obtain information and does not confer a right to a hearing. Delegated legislation, where the statute does not provide for notice or hearing, cannot be read down to incorporate principles of natural justice. Consequently, no statutory obligation arose for the Government to hold a fresh hearing before granting sanction.No requirement exists under section 37(2) for the State Government to afford a fresh hearing; the High Court erred in holding otherwise.Promissory estoppel not available against statute or statutory rules - Applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Development Control Rules (which have statutory force) or the State while sanctioning DCR modifications. - HELD THAT: - Development Control Rules framed under the Act are rules of subordinate legislation and possess statutory force. It is settled that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against a statute or statutory rule. The High Court's application of promissory estoppel to prevent the Corporation from insisting that additional FSI be used on the same plot was contrary to this principle. Where statutory provisions govern the scheme, equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel cannot override the statutory power exercised in making or amending such rules.Promissory estoppel cannot be applied against the statute or DCR; the High Court was wrong to allow the petition on that basis.Final Conclusion: The High Court's order was set aside: the State Government was within its statutory power under section 37(2) to modify and impose conditions when sanctioning the DCR amendments, no fresh hearing was required under that provision, and promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutory rules; the writ petitions were dismissed. Issues involved:The legality of the amendment to the Development Control Rules (DCR) sanctioned by the State Government of Maharashtra under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.Summary:The Supreme Court considered whether the State Government had the authority to make changes to the modifications submitted by the Planning Authority under section 37 of the Act. The Court analyzed the provisions of section 37(1) and (2) which outline the process for proposing and sanctioning modifications to the Development Plan. It was emphasized that the Government has the discretion to make necessary modifications, impose conditions, or refuse sanction, as long as the proposed changes do not alter the basic character of the development plan. The Court clarified that the legislative power to amend DCR is delegated to the State Government, and the Act does not mandate a public hearing before according sanction.The Court highlighted that the DCR, framed under section 158 of the Act, have statutory force, and there can be no 'promissory estoppel' against a statute. Therefore, the High Court erred in invoking the principle of 'promissory estoppel' to support the Respondents' petition. The Court concluded that unless arbitrariness or unreasonableness is demonstrated, it is not within the Court's purview to interfere with legislative functions. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the Respondents.