Show-cause notice interference is limited where input tax credit reversal turns on disputed facts and jurisdiction is not clear.

Writ interference at the show-cause stage is exceptional and is warranted only when lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process is prima facie shown. Where the challenge to proposed reversal of input tax credit depends on factual adjudication, including objections to the notice and the selling dealers' compliance materials, the writ court will not pre-empt the statutory process. The petitioner must first place its explanation before the assessing authority, and the authority must examine the matter on the record. On that basis, the court declined to interfere with the notices and left the petitioner to pursue objections before the departmental authority.

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Issues: Whether the writ petitions challenging the show-cause notices proposing reversal of input tax credit on the basis of the selling dealers' default were liable to be entertained at the notice stage.

Analysis: The challenge was founded on the plea that action against the purchasing dealer was without jurisdiction and contrary to earlier decisions on input tax credit. The Court held that the matter required factual adjudication, particularly on the objections to the notices and the materials regarding the selling dealers' compliance. It reiterated that interference at the stage of a show-cause notice is exceptional and is justified only when lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process is prima facie established. Since the petitioner had an opportunity to place its explanation before the authority, the writ court would not pre-empt the statutory process.

Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere with the show-cause notices and left the petitioner to submit objections before the assessing authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court should not interfere with a show-cause notice where the challenge depends on factual adjudication and the alleged want of jurisdiction is not prima facie established.

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