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Issues: Whether Rule 17 of the Employees' State Insurance Rules was within the State Government's rule-making power under Section 96(1)(b) of the Employees State Insurance Act 1948, and whether a period of limitation could be prescribed for applications by the Corporation to the Employees' Insurance Court.
Analysis: The rule-making power under Section 96(1)(b) was confined to prescribing the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the Court after an application had been filed. A rule fixing a time limit for initiating proceedings did not merely regulate procedure; it barred the claim itself and could extinguish the substantive right to recover contributions. The scheme of the Act showed that where the legislature intended limitation, it expressly provided for it, while the recovery mechanism for contributions under Section 68 and the adjudicatory provisions in Section 75 contained no such period. The later insertion of a specific limitation in Section 77(1A) further indicated that the power under Section 96(1)(b) did not already include authority to create a limitation period by rule.
Conclusion: Rule 17 was ultra vires the State Government's rule-making power, and no limitation governed the Corporation's application under Section 75(2)(d) until the legislature later provided one.
Ratio Decidendi: A delegated power to prescribe procedure for proceedings before a court does not, without clear legislative authorization, include the power to impose a limitation period that extinguishes the substantive right or bars the claim itself.