Approver testimony needs independent corroboration; revision cannot upset acquittal absent manifest illegality or miscarriage of justice.

An approver's evidence can sustain conviction only if the witness is reliable and the material particulars are independently corroborated; inconsistent versions in the press statement, pardon application, Section 164 statement and trial evidence undermined reliability, so the convictions were set aside and the appellants acquitted. Grant of pardon was not invalid merely because the approver later enjoyed constitutional immunity under Article 105(2). Revisional interference with acquittal is confined to exceptional cases of manifest illegality, glaring procedural defect or gross miscarriage of justice; absent such error, a mere reappraisal of evidence is insufficient, so the challenge to the remaining accused's acquittal failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the approver's testimony and the grant of pardon could be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the appellants. (ii) Whether the High Court could interfere in revision with the acquittal of the other accused.

Issue (i): Whether the approver's testimony and the grant of pardon could be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the appellants.

Analysis: The approver had made materially inconsistent versions at different stages, including the press statement, the application for pardon, the statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and his deposition in court. The crucial allegation of a closed-door meeting and a money deal was introduced only in the later version and was not supported by independent evidence. The Court held that an approver must first be a reliable witness and, even then, his evidence requires corroboration in material particulars from an independent source. Previous statements of the approver could not amount to such independent corroboration. The Court also held that the grant of pardon did not suffer from a jurisdictional defect merely because the approver later enjoyed constitutional immunity under Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The approver's evidence was not reliable enough to sustain conviction, and the appellants were entitled to acquittal.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could interfere in revision with the acquittal of the other accused.

Analysis: Revisional interference against acquittal is confined to exceptional cases involving manifest illegality, glaring procedural defect, or gross miscarriage of justice. The Court found no such defect, illegality, or omission in the trial court's appreciation of evidence. The grounds urged amounted only to a different appraisal of the same evidence, which is insufficient in revision, especially when the State had not appealed against the acquittals.

Conclusion: The revision against acquittal was not maintainable on the merits and was liable to be dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The convictions and sentences of the appellants were set aside and they were acquitted, while the challenge to the acquittal of the remaining accused failed.

Ratio Decidendi: An approver's testimony can sustain conviction only if it is itself reliable and receives independent corroboration in material particulars; in revision, an acquittal can be disturbed only for manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, not for a mere reappraisal of evidence.

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