Mandatory effect of "may" and quasi-judicial fairness required for statutory relief claims under the exemption revocation framework

The expression "may" in section 5(3) was treated as mandatory in effect where the statutory conditions for relief were satisfied, because the scheme and purpose of the Act showed that eligible claimants were not to be denied relief at discretion. The Government was therefore bound to grant the relief once the protected conditions were met. The Act also required a quasi-judicial approach: claimants had to be heard and reasons had to be disclosed before rejection. An unexplained refusal without hearing did not satisfy the statutory duty and was invalid.

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Issues: (i) Whether the word "may" in section 5(3) of the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 conferred an absolute discretion on the Government to refuse a grant of money or pension even when the statutory conditions were satisfied; (ii) whether the Government's order rejecting the claim without reasons and without hearing the claimants satisfied the requirements of the Act and quasi-judicial process.

Issue (i): Whether the word "may" in section 5(3) of the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 conferred an absolute discretion on the Government to refuse a grant of money or pension even when the statutory conditions were satisfied.

Analysis: The scheme of section 5 distinguished between the general power under sub-section (2) and the special cases covered by sub-section (3). The surrounding rules and the structure of the Act showed that applications falling within the protected classes were to receive special treatment. In that setting, the enabling word "may" in sub-section (3) could not be read as conferring unfettered discretion where the requisite conditions existed. The statutory purpose would be defeated if eligible persons or institutions could be denied relief at pleasure.

Conclusion: The word "may" in section 5(3) was mandatory in effect, and the Government was bound to grant relief when the statutory conditions were fulfilled.

Issue (ii): Whether the Government's order rejecting the claim without reasons and without hearing the claimants satisfied the requirements of the Act and quasi-judicial process.

Analysis: The Act imposed a duty requiring the Government to act judicially in dealing with claims under section 5. Since a civil suit was barred, fairness required an opportunity of hearing and disclosure of reasons, especially where the claim was rejected after the Deputy Commissioner's report. An unexplained rejection did not meet the elementary requirements of a quasi-judicial determination.

Conclusion: The Government's order was invalid and liable to be set aside for failure to comply with the requirements of a quasi-judicial process.

Final Conclusion: The statutory relief provision was construed as obligatory in qualifying cases, and the impugned rejection could not stand because it was made without the procedural fairness required by the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers power to grant relief for the benefit of specified classes, the apparently permissive expression "may" may be construed as mandatory when the statutory conditions are satisfied, and any rejection must conform to quasi-judicial fairness including reasons and hearing where required by the scheme of the Act.

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