Special-power compensation orders are not binding precedent, and subordinate criminal courts cannot extend them after acquittal.
Only the law declared by the Supreme Court binds under Article 141; an order granting compensation on peculiar facts and in exercise of special constitutional power is not a general precedent. On that basis, the High Court and subordinate criminal courts cannot award compensation to a complainant in a Section 494 prosecution after acquittal merely by relying on such an order, absent an independent legal basis. The compensation component of the Magistrate's order was therefore set aside.
Issues: (i) Whether an order of the Supreme Court awarding compensation in a bigamy prosecution, made in exercise of special powers, operates as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the High Court or subordinate criminal courts can award compensation to the complainant in a prosecution under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, after acquittal of the accused, by relying on such Supreme Court order.
Issue (i): Whether an order of the Supreme Court awarding compensation in a bigamy prosecution, made in exercise of special powers, operates as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The binding force under Article 141 extends only to the law declared by the Supreme Court. A decision rendered on peculiar facts, or by exercising special constitutional power, does not necessarily create a general rule of law. The principle that binds later courts is the ratio decidendi, not the result reached on special facts. Where compensation is awarded in the exercise of extraordinary power, the order cannot be treated as a universal precedent for all similar prosecutions.
Conclusion: No. Such an order does not operate as a binding precedent under Article 141.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court or subordinate criminal courts can award compensation to the complainant in a prosecution under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, after acquittal of the accused, by relying on such Supreme Court order.
Analysis: Criminal precedents must be applied with caution and only where the factual and legal situation is truly comparable. The power exercised by the Supreme Court in the cited case flowed from its special constitutional authority and could not be transplanted as a general power of subordinate courts. In the absence of an independent legal basis, a criminal court cannot award compensation merely because a similar order was passed by the Supreme Court in a different factual setting.
Conclusion: No. The High Court and subordinate courts have no such power on the basis of that precedent.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered against the power of the courts below to award compensation on the footing of the cited Supreme Court order, and the compensation component of the Magistrate's order was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Only the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding under Article 141, and an order made in exercise of special constitutional power on peculiar facts cannot be treated as a general precedent authorising subordinate criminal courts to grant compensation after acquittal.
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