Externment orders require a real hearing before restricting liberty; breach makes the order void and unenforceable.

An externment order made without the statutory hearing and fair opportunity required before restricting liberty is void ab initio, because compliance with natural justice is a condition for valid exercise of the power. The defect is not a mere irregularity but a fundamental breach of the constitutional and statutory obligation to hear the affected person before curtailing a fundamental freedom. As the invalidity relates back to the start once the order is quashed, the order cannot be treated as having legal existence for the purpose of criminal liability. On that basis, disobedience of the quashed order does not constitute an offence and acquittal follows.

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Issues: Whether an externment order passed in breach of the statutory requirement of hearing and fair opportunity is void ab initio and, if so, whether disobedience of that order before it was quashed can constitute an offence.

Analysis: The order of externment was made under a statute that imposed a duty to hear the affected person before restricting a fundamental freedom. The defect was not a mere irregularity in an otherwise valid order, but a violation of the constitutional and statutory obligation to afford a real hearing before curtailing liberty. An order made in breach of such mandatory hearing requirement cannot be treated as effective from inception, because the exercise of power itself remains conditioned by compliance with natural justice when a fundamental right is being restricted. Once the order was quashed for that reason, its invalidity related back to the beginning and it could not be treated as having had legal existence for the purpose of founding criminal liability.

Conclusion: The externment order was a nullity from the start, and its alleged breach did not amount to an offence; the appeal succeeds and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

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