Commission of Inquiry powers upheld for past official misconduct; limited cross-examination rights under the statute.

A Commission of Inquiry could validly be appointed to examine alleged official misconduct and acquisition of wealth by a former Minister, because Section 37 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir did not bar such an inquiry and the allegations raised definite matters of public importance. The notification was not shown to be mala fide, as the record did not establish colourable exercise of power or mere political rivalry. No hostile discrimination arose from singling out the former Minister, since the alleged misconduct placed him in a distinct class with a direct rational link to the inquiry's object. The proceedings were also not vitiated by denial of inspection or unrestricted cross-examination, as the Act allowed only the procedural rights expressly provided.

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Issues: (i) whether the Commission of Inquiry could be validly appointed under the statute to inquire into the alleged conduct and assets of the former Minister, and whether the subject-matter was a definite matter of public importance; (ii) whether the notification was invalid on the ground of mala fides; (iii) whether the notification offended equality by singling out the former Minister; and (iv) whether the proceedings of the Commission were vitiated because the person proceeded against was denied inspection of documents and an unrestricted right to cross-examine deponents of affidavits.

Issue (i): whether the Commission of Inquiry could be validly appointed under the statute to inquire into the alleged conduct and assets of the former Minister, and whether the subject-matter was a definite matter of public importance.

Analysis: Section 37 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, dealing with collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly, was held not to bar an inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act. The power under Section 3 of the Act enabled the Government to appoint a Commission, and the statute itself contemplated inquiries both at the instance of the Government and on legislative resolution. The matters referred for inquiry concerned alleged acquisition of wealth by abuse of official position over a long period, and such allegations were intrinsic matters of public importance. The fact that the concerned person was no longer in office when the notification issued did not alter the character of the past conduct. The omission of the word "definite" in the notification was not fatal because the allegations were sufficiently identifiable and not vague.

Conclusion: The notification was within the scope of the Act and the matters referred were definite matters of public importance; this issue was decided against the respondent and in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): whether the notification was invalid on the ground of mala fides.

Analysis: The alleged political rivalry and surrounding events were examined, but the materials did not establish that the Government acted from malice or that the Commission was set up merely to eliminate political rivalry. The arrest, prorogation, and subsequent inquiry were not shown to be a colourable exercise of power. The record also supported the view that the Government had prima facie material prompting the inquiry.

Conclusion: Mala fides was not established; this issue was decided against the respondent and in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): whether the notification offended equality by singling out the former Minister.

Analysis: The inquiry concerned alleged acquisition of wealth by misuse of official position by a particular person and those connected with him. He stood in a class by himself for the purpose of the inquiry because the alleged misconduct and alleged enrichment were specifically attributed to him and not to the other members of the Cabinet. The classification had a direct rational connection with the object of the inquiry.

Conclusion: No hostile discrimination or violation of equality was made out; this issue was decided against the respondent and in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iv): whether the proceedings of the Commission were vitiated because the person proceeded against was denied inspection of documents and an unrestricted right to cross-examine deponents of affidavits.

Analysis: The complaint regarding inspection had become academic because inspection of the relevant documents was subsequently granted. As to cross-examination, Section 10 of the Act was held to provide a limited right confined to persons appearing before the Commission to give viva voce evidence, and not a general right to cross-examine all deponents whose affidavits were filed. Section 4(c) empowering reception of evidence on affidavits was treated as an independent procedural power not controlled by Order 19 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code so as to require production of every affidavit-witness for cross-examination. The Act and rules contemplated a flexible and expeditious fact-finding procedure.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not invalid on the ground urged; this issue was decided against the respondent and in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The judgment of the High Court could not be sustained, and the challenge to the Commission notification and proceedings failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Commission of Inquiry may validly investigate definite matters of public importance concerning past official misconduct, even after the person concerned has left office, and the statutory right of hearing and cross-examination is confined to the limits expressly provided by the Act and the rules framed under it.

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