1998 (4) TMI 536 - SC - Indian Laws

Court validates third judge referral under Section 98(2) CPC, affirms non-Sikh Gurudwara status.

The court upheld the validity of referring the matter to a third judge under Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that such ... - Issues Involved:1. Validity of referring the matter to a third judge under Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.2. Whether Mahant Puran Dass was a hereditary office holder and had locus standi to maintain the petition under Section 8 of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925.3. Whether the institution in question is a Sikh Gurudwara under Section 16(2)(iii) of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925.Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of Referring the Matter to a Third Judge:The appellant argued that the reference to a third judge was violative of Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) as no point of law was framed or stated by the judges who expressed different opinions. However, the court noted that this contention was not raised at any stage before the arguments in this appeal and was not even included in the Special Leave Petition. The court highlighted that Section 98(3) of the C.P.C. allows for such references under the Letters Patent of any High Court, and Clause 26 of the Letters Patent for the Punjab High Court permits the case to be decided based on the majority opinion of the judges. The court cited various rulings, including Mahant Swarn Dass Versus Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 110, to support that the provisions of Section 98, C.P.C., are not applicable to High Courts governed by Letters Patent. Therefore, the reference to Justice Gupta was not vitiated and did not suffer from any infirmity.2. Hereditary Office Holder and Locus Standi:The court examined whether Mahant Puran Dass was a hereditary office holder under Section 2(4)(iv) of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925. The evidence showed that the office of Mahant devolved from guru to chela, and this custom had been in practice for a long time. The court referred to Ex. R-14 and the pedigree table therein, which demonstrated that the succession of Mahantship followed a hereditary pattern. The court also cited Mahant Dharam Dass Chela Karam Prakash Versus Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 64 (F.B.), where it was held that such succession constituted hereditary succession. The court concluded that the nomination of a chela by the Bhek after the death of the office holder fell within the scope of hereditary succession. Thus, Mahant Puran Dass was a hereditary office holder, and the view taken by Justice Yadav and Justice Gupta was correct.3. Whether the Institution is a Sikh Gurudwara:The Tribunal had held that the institution satisfied the requirements of Section 16(2)(iii) of the Act, which necessitates that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for public worship and was used for such worship both before and at the time of the petition. The court noted that none of the sixty persons who presented the petition under Section 7(1) entered the witness box to support their claim. The entries in the Jamabandi Register and mutation register only indicated ownership by 'Dera Guru Granth Sahib,' which did not prove the purpose of establishment or use for Sikh worship. The court found Ex. R-14, the proceedings of the Settlement Commissioner in 1903, more reliable, which indicated that the institution was not established for use by Sikhs but was granted to an Udasi Sadhu.The court also referred to various precedents, including Lachhman Das and others versus Atma Singh and others AIR 1935 Lahore 666 and Pritam Das Mahant versus Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (1984) 2 S.C.C. 600, which emphasized that the mere presence of Guru Granth Sahib did not make an institution a Sikh Gurudwara. The court highlighted that the institution had several features inconsistent with a Sikh Gurudwara, such as the presence of samadhis, celebration of Hindu festivals, and the absence of Nishan Sahib.Based on the analysis, the court concluded that the institution was not a Sikh Gurudwara, and the High Court rightly set aside the Tribunal's order. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.