Supreme Court dismisses time-barred complaint under Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Limitation period is mandatory.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissing the complaint as time-barred under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Emphasizing the mandatory nature of the limitation period, the Court highlighted the necessity for compliance. The issues of deficiency in service and authorization of B.M. Konar were deemed irrelevant due to the dismissal based on limitation. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the complainant was a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
2. Whether the complaint was time-barred.
3. Whether there was a deficiency in service by the bank.
4. Whether B.M. Konar was authorized to collect the bills and GRs from the bank.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Consumer Status
The bank contested that the complainant was not a consumer within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. However, this issue was not a focal point in the judgment, as the primary contention revolved around the limitation period and deficiency in service.

Issue 2: Limitation Period
The core issue was whether the complaint was filed within the limitation period prescribed under Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Section 24A mandates that a complaint must be filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises. The Supreme Court emphasized that this provision is peremptory and requires consumer fora to ensure that complaints are filed within this period unless sufficient cause for delay is shown and recorded in writing.

The complainant's cause of action accrued on June 7, 1994, when the bank failed to return the documents or remit the amount. The complaint was filed on May 5, 1997, well beyond the two-year limitation period. The complainant argued that subsequent correspondence with the bank extended the limitation period, but the Court found that the bank's reply did not acknowledge liability and thus did not extend the limitation period. Consequently, the complaint was time-barred.

Issue 3: Deficiency in Service
The District Forum initially found that there was a deficiency in service by the bank, as it failed to remit the amount or return the documents as instructed, and awarded compensation to the complainant. This finding was upheld by the State Commission and the National Commission. However, since the complaint was ultimately found to be time-barred, the Supreme Court did not delve further into this issue.

Issue 4: Authorization of B.M. Konar
The District Forum also considered whether B.M. Konar was authorized to collect the documents from the bank. It was determined that the bank had returned the documents to B.M. Konar, the complainant's sales manager, on May 10, 1994. The complainant challenged this, but the Court found that the complainant had acknowledged this fact in their complaint and subsequent correspondence. This issue became moot once the complaint was dismissed as time-barred.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the National Commission and dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court underscored the mandatory nature of the limitation period under Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and emphasized that consumer fora must ensure compliance with this provision. The other issues, including deficiency in service and authorization of B.M. Konar, were rendered irrelevant due to the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of limitation. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

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