Second appeal interference and testamentary construction turned on a specifically framed legal question and the testator's intention.

In second appeal, interference with a first appellate finding is confined to a specifically framed substantial question of law; a bare challenge to the nature of property was insufficient. The Will had to be read as a whole to ascertain the testator's intention from its language and surrounding circumstances. On that construction, the recitals showed a limited dedication for the benefit of the appellant and his widowed mother, supported by post-death conduct and possession. The property was therefore not joint family property, and title vested in the appellant and his mother.

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Issues: (i) whether the question framed by the High Court concerning the nature of the property was a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) whether, on a proper construction of the Will, the house property vested in the appellant and his mother.

Issue (i): whether the question framed by the High Court concerning the nature of the property was a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The power of the High Court in second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law. A finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court can be disturbed only if it is based on no evidence, is perverse, or suffers from misapplication of settled legal principles. Even in such cases, the substantial question of law must be specifically framed. A bare formulation of the issue whether the property is joint family property, without framing the legal basis on which the factual finding could be reopened, was not sufficient.

Conclusion: The question as framed was not, by itself, a substantial question of law.

Issue (ii): whether, on a proper construction of the Will, the house property vested in the appellant and his mother.

Analysis: The Will had to be construed as a whole, giving effect to the intention of the testator from the language used and the surrounding circumstances. The recitals showed that the testator intended to set apart Rs. 30,000 for the maintenance, education and marriage of the appellant and his widowed mother, and to use the proposed immovable property as the subject of that dedication. The use of the expression equivalent to wakf indicated an intention to divest beneficial control and create a limited dedication for their benefit. The surrounding conduct after the testator's death, including mutation in the mother's name and exclusive possession by the appellant and his mother, supported that construction. Applying the principles governing testamentary interpretation, the property could not be treated as joint family property.

Conclusion: The title to the property vested in the appellant and his mother.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's judgment could not stand, and the decree in favour of the appellant resulted from a correct construction of the Will and the limits of second appellate interference.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, a factual finding can be interfered with only when a substantial question of law is specifically framed and the Will must be interpreted as a whole to ascertain and give effect to the testator's intention from its language and surrounding circumstances.

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