1997 (8) TMI 514 - HC - Indian Laws

Exclusive jurisdiction for anticipatory bail in economic offences cases clarified by court

Fakhruddin Sharafali Ampanwala Versus State

Fakhruddin Sharafali Ampanwala Versus State - 1997 (5) ALD 735, 1997 (2) ALD Cri 623, 1998 CriLJ 439 Issues Involved:1. Whether an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be moved before the Sessions Judge, Hyderabad instead of the Special Judge for Economic Offences.Detailed Analysis:1. Jurisdiction of Special Judge for Economic Offences:The court examined whether the Sessions Judge, Hyderabad has jurisdiction to entertain an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in cases exclusively triable by the Special Judge for Economic Offences. It was noted that the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Superintendent Customs and Central Excise, Range II, Nellore Division, Nellore v. Elukala Krishnamachari, held that only the Special Judge for Economic Offences is competent to entertain such applications. This view was reconsidered in light of a government notification conferring powers of Chief Judicial Magistrate on certain Additional District and Sessions Judges, but the court reaffirmed that the Special Judge for Economic Offences has exclusive jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the jurisdiction of ordinary sessions courts is impliedly ousted by the notification establishing the Special Court for Economic Offences.2. Government Notification and Establishment of Special Court:The court reviewed the establishment of the Special Court for Economic Offences by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, which was created to handle cases under specified Central Acts. The notification specified that the Special Court would have jurisdiction over the entire state and would be presided over by an officer in the cadre of District and Sessions Judge. The court noted that the Special Court is distinct from regular courts and has exclusive jurisdiction over economic offences, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of regular sessions courts.3. Relevant Legal Provisions and Precedents:The court referred to various legal provisions and precedents to support its conclusion. It cited Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for the establishment of Special Courts, and Section 2(j), which defines local jurisdiction. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's decision in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, which clarified the powers and jurisdiction of Special Judges under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. Additionally, the court considered the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Ravi Nandan Sahay, which held that Special Judges have exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance and try offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.4. Conflict of Jurisdiction:The court addressed the potential conflict of jurisdiction if both the Special Court for Economic Offences and the regular Sessions Court were allowed to entertain applications for anticipatory bail. It concluded that recognizing the jurisdiction of both courts would create conflicts and undermine the purpose of establishing a Special Court with exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the court held that the Special Court for Economic Offences alone has the jurisdiction to entertain applications for anticipatory bail in cases under the specified Central Acts.Conclusion:The court concluded that the Special Court for Economic Offences, having jurisdiction throughout the state, is exclusively empowered to entertain applications for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in cases under the specified Central Acts. The jurisdiction of the regular Sessions Court is excluded in such matters. The reference was answered accordingly, affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court for Economic Offences.