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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the appellant had an alternative statutory remedy, despite allegations that the taxing provisions were ultra vires and that the assessment was made in violation of natural justice.
Analysis: The rule that a litigant should ordinarily pursue an adequate statutory remedy before invoking writ jurisdiction is a rule of policy, convenience, and discretion, not a rule of law. It does not bar relief where the proceedings are challenged as lacking legal authority or where the impugned order is said to have been made in breach of natural justice. In such exceptional cases, the High Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the availability of appeal. Since the writ petition contained allegations questioning the validity of the taxing provisions, the authority to levy the tax, the constitutional limits under Article 276, and the fairness of the assessment procedure, summary dismissal solely on the ground of alternative remedy was not in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy was unsustainable, and the writ petition had to be restored for decision according to law.
Ratio Decidendi: The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not bar writ relief where the challenge is to the competence of the taxing authority or to a violation of natural justice; the rule of exhaustion is one of discretion and admits of exceptions.