Section 9-A disqualification turns on a contract with the State Government itself, not merely a statutory instrumentality.

For disqualification under section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, the expression "appropriate Government" means the State Government in its ordinary sense, not a statutory corporation or authority merely falling within Article 12. Accordingly, contracts with GMIDC or MJP did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a subsisting contract with the State Government. Where a statute transfers projects, assets, rights and obligations to a corporation, the subsisting contract relating to that project continues with the transferee without a fresh assignment or contractor consent, and ceases to be a contract with the State Government. On those principles, the appellant did not incur disqualification under section 9-A.

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Issues: (i) Whether a statutory body or authority that answers the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India is an appropriate Government for the purposes of section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and whether GMIDC and MJP were such appropriate Government; (ii) Whether the contract dated 19.5.1996, originally entered into with the State Government, continued to be a contract with the State Government after its statutory transfer to GMIDC; (iii) Whether the appellant incurred disqualification under section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on account of the three contracts.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory body or authority that answers the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India is an appropriate Government for the purposes of section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and whether GMIDC and MJP were such appropriate Government

Analysis: The disqualification under section 9-A is confined to a subsisting contract with the State Government for supply of goods or execution of works undertaken by that Government. The expression appropriate Government in section 7, read with section 9-A, must be understood in its ordinary sense and not by importing the enlarged meaning of State under Article 12. Article 12 is relevant to Part III of the Constitution and cannot be used to equate statutory corporations or other authorities with the State Government for election disqualification provisions. The inclusive constitutional definition of State does not collapse the distinction between State Government and instrumentalities of the State when the Act deliberately uses the narrower expression State Government.

Conclusion: GMIDC and MJP were not the State Government or the appropriate Government under section 9-A, and the answer to this issue was in the negative.

Issue (ii): Whether the contract dated 19.5.1996, originally entered into with the State Government, continued to be a contract with the State Government after its statutory transfer to GMIDC

Analysis: Where a statute vests specified projects, assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of the State Government in a statutory corporation, the statute itself engrafts upon the subsisting contract and substitutes the corporation in place of the original employer. In such a case, no separate assignment instrument or contractor consent is required. From the appointed date, the rights and obligations under the contract relating to the transferred project stood vested in GMIDC, and the contract ceased to be one with the State Government, though it continued as a subsisting contract with GMIDC.

Conclusion: The contract dated 19.5.1996 was no longer a contract with the State Government after the statutory transfer and vesting, and the answer to this issue was in the negative.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant incurred disqualification under section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on account of the three contracts

Analysis: The appellant's subsisting contracts were either with GMIDC or with MJP. Since neither body was the appropriate Government for section 9-A, the essential statutory condition for disqualification was not satisfied. A disqualification under section 9-A can arise only where each statutory ingredient is squarely met, including a subsisting contract with the State Government itself.

Conclusion: The appellant did not incur disqualification under section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Final Conclusion: The election petition challenging the appellant's election was not maintainable on the pleaded ground of disqualification, and the High Court's order voiding the election could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: For election disqualification under section 9-A, the phrase appropriate Government means the State Government in its ordinary sense, and a statutory corporation or authority that is merely an instrumentality of the State is not enough unless the contract is with the State Government itself.

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