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Issues: (i) Whether a specific formal order under section 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, No. 38 of 1944 was necessary before the District Judge could act under section 13(3); (ii) Whether forfeiture under section 13(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, No. 38 of 1944 amounted to a penalty hit by Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether a specific formal order under section 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, No. 38 of 1944 was necessary before the District Judge could act under section 13(3).
Analysis: Section 12 required the criminal court, when it convicted the accused after an attachment order had been made, to record a finding as to the amount of money or value of other property procured by the offence. The essential requirement was the existence of such a finding in the criminal judgment, not a particular formula or express reference to a representation under section 12. A finding recorded for the purpose of minimum fine under section 10 of the Criminal Law (1943 Amendment) Ordinance, No. 12 of 1945 could satisfy section 12 if it determined the amount procured by the offence. Section 12 did not require the criminal court to value the attached property itself; where the attached property was not the very property procured by the offence, valuation was for the District Judge at the stage of forfeiture under section 13(3).
Conclusion: A finding that at least Rs. 30 lakhs had been procured by the offence was sufficient compliance with section 12, and the District Judge had jurisdiction to proceed under section 13(3).
Issue (ii): Whether forfeiture under section 13(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, No. 38 of 1944 amounted to a penalty hit by Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The Ordinance was treated as a measure for attachment and realisation of money or property procured by the offence, not as a penal statute imposing punishment for the offence. Forfeiture under section 13(3) was characterised as a mechanism for recovering Government money or property by a speedier process than a civil suit. It was distinguished from punitive forfeiture under section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Since the provision did not impose a criminal penalty within the meaning of Article 20(1), the constitutional bar against ex post facto punishment did not apply.
Conclusion: Section 13(3) did not impose a penalty within Article 20(1), and the forfeiture order was not unconstitutional.
Final Conclusion: The District Judge's order of forfeiture was legally sustainable, and the High Court's interference was unwarranted. The appeal succeeded and the forfeiture proceedings were restored to continue in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A finding in the criminal judgment as to the amount procured by the offence is sufficient for forfeiture under section 13(3), and such forfeiture is a civil recovery mechanism rather than a criminal penalty barred by Article 20(1).