1957 (1) TMI 36 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of Industrial Disputes Act 1947

NIEMLA TEXTILE FINISHING MILLS LTD. Versus 2ND PUNJAB TRIBUNAL

NIEMLA TEXTILE FINISHING MILLS LTD. Versus 2ND PUNJAB TRIBUNAL - 1957 AIR 329, 1957 (0) SCR 335 Issues Involved:1. Vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.2. Competency of the State Government to refer industrial disputes.3. Constitutionality of Section 10 of the Act under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.4. Alleged delegation of legislative power to Industrial Tribunals.5. Legislative competence of the Central Legislature to enact the Act.Detailed Analysis:1. Vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:The appellants challenged the vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming it was unconstitutional. They argued that the Act conferred unregulated and arbitrary powers on the appropriate Government, which violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. The Court held that Section 10 of the Act was not discriminatory in its ambit and that the discretion vested in the appropriate Government was guided by the Act's objectives. The Court concluded that the Act was intra vires the Constitution.2. Competency of the State Government to Refer Industrial Disputes:The appellants contended that their mills were controlled industries under the Industry (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and thus, the appropriate Government for referring disputes should be the Union Government, not the State Government. This issue was ultimately abandoned during the hearing, and the Court did not address it further.3. Constitutionality of Section 10 of the Act:The appellants argued that Section 10 of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution as it conflicted with Article 14, being discriminatory in its scope and conferring arbitrary powers on the appropriate Government. The Court found that the discretion to refer disputes to different authorities was not unfettered or unguided. The Act provided criteria for the exercise of such discretion, aiming to settle industrial disputes and promote industrial peace. The Court held that Section 10 did not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(f) and (g).4. Alleged Delegation of Legislative Power to Industrial Tribunals:The appellants contended that Industrial Tribunals were legislating in the guise of adjudication, which amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the Tribunals' functions were to settle industrial disputes and promote industrial peace, not to legislate. The principles laid down by the Tribunals were not rules of law but guidelines for resolving disputes. The Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power to the Tribunals.5. Legislative Competence of the Central Legislature:The appellants argued that the definition of 'industry' in Section 2(j) of the Act included non-industrial concerns, which was beyond the legislative competence of the Central Legislature under Entry 29 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court held that the definition of 'industry' was within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature. The Court noted that the Act aimed to settle industrial disputes and promote industrial peace, which fell within the scope of Entry 29. The Court also mentioned that the definition could be justified under Entry 27, which related to the welfare of labor.Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and petitions, holding that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was intra vires the Constitution. The Court found that the Act did not violate the fundamental rights of the appellants and that the discretion vested in the appropriate Government was guided by the Act's objectives. The Court also held that there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Industrial Tribunals and that the Central Legislature had the competence to enact the Act. The appellants were ordered to pay one set of costs to the respondents in the appeals, while each party was to bear its own costs in the petitions.