Ballot secrecy protects against compulsion, but proved tampering can justify inspection and election nullification for improper votes.

Section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was treated as a qualified privilege protecting a voter from compulsion to disclose the vote, not as an absolute bar against voluntary disclosure. Inspection of tampered postal ballot papers and examination of voters was permitted where the pleadings and evidence disclosed a prima facie case of alteration, and the voters could be questioned with reference to their own ballots. Proven tampering that caused improper reception and refusal of votes fell within section 100(1)(d)(iii), and the election could be set aside where the true voting intention was ascertainable from reliable evidence.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 confers an absolute bar against a voter being questioned about his vote or only a privilege not to be compelled to disclose it; (ii) whether inspection of the tampered postal ballot papers and examination of the voters with reference to those ballots was permissible; and (iii) whether the proved tampering of the ballots attracted section 100(1)(d)(iii) so as to justify setting aside the election.

Issue (i): whether section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 confers an absolute bar against a voter being questioned about his vote or only a privilege not to be compelled to disclose it;

Analysis: Section 94 was read in the setting of the Act as part of the procedure for trial of election petitions, alongside section 87(2) and section 95. The prohibition against disclosure was held to protect the voter from compulsion, not to create an inviolable secrecy that could be used to suppress proof of fraud. The secrecy of the ballot was treated as serving the larger constitutional purpose of free and fair elections, and the voter was held entitled to waive the privilege voluntarily.

Conclusion: Section 94 creates a qualified privilege in favour of the voter, not an absolute embargo; voluntary disclosure by the voter is permissible.

Issue (ii): whether inspection of the tampered postal ballot papers and examination of the voters with reference to those ballots was permissible;

Analysis: The pleadings and the evidence of the counting agent furnished a prima facie basis for inspection, since the petition alleged tampering of specific postal ballots and the evidence pointed to overwriting and alteration visible on the face of the ballots. Inspection was therefore justified to resolve the dispute and do complete justice, and once the voters voluntarily answered questions about their own ballots, their evidence was admissible. The Court also held that tampered ballots need not automatically be ignored where their original voting intention can be ascertained with reliable evidence.

Conclusion: Inspection and examination of the voters were validly permitted, and the tampered ballots could be looked into for ascertaining the true voting intention.

Issue (iii): whether the proved tampering of the ballots attracted section 100(1)(d)(iii) so as to justify setting aside the election;

Analysis: The proved alteration of four postal ballots resulted in improper reception of votes in favour of the returned candidate and improper refusal of votes in favour of the rival candidate. The statutory ground in section 100(1)(d)(iii) was held wide enough to cover such infirmity, and section 64A did not apply because the tampering was limited and the true result of the poll remained ascertainable. The Court affirmed that election law must be construed to preserve purity of election and prevent fraud from gaining advantage.

Conclusion: The election was validly set aside on the ground of improper reception and refusal of votes under section 100(1)(d)(iii).

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, the election of the returned candidate remained void, and the declaration in favour of the rival candidate stood undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Secrecy of the ballot under section 94 protects a voter from compulsion but does not bar voluntary disclosure; where tampering of ballots is proved and the original voting intention can be reliably ascertained, the vote may be counted according to that intention and the election may be voided under section 100(1)(d)(iii) for improper reception or refusal of votes.

---