General statutes bind the State unless excluded by express words or necessary implication under constitutional construction principles.

A general statute binds the State unless express words or necessary implication exclude it. The Court held that the pre-Constitution Crown exemption rule was only a canon of construction, not "law in force" under Article 372, and therefore did not survive as a governing principle for interpreting Indian statutes. Applying that approach to the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, section 218 imposed the licensing obligation on the State because it used general language and contained no express exemption. Section 541 and the related penal provisions did not create a necessary implication of exclusion, so the statutory scheme left the State subject to the licence requirement.

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Issues: (i) Whether the pre-Constitution rule that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless expressly named or bound by necessary implication continued as law in force under Article 372 of the Constitution of India and governed the construction of Indian statutes after the Constitution; (ii) Whether the State was bound by section 218 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 to take out a licence for carrying on trade at the market and, if so, whether section 541 and the connected penal provisions excluded such liability by necessary implication.

Issue (i): Whether the pre-Constitution rule that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless expressly named or bound by necessary implication continued as law in force under Article 372 of the Constitution of India and governed the construction of Indian statutes after the Constitution.

Analysis: The majority held that the English canon was a rule of construction, not a substantive rule of law, and therefore not "law in force" within Article 372. It further held that the rule was unsuited to a republican Constitution founded on equality, created anomalies in a federal system, and should not be applied to interpret Indian statutes. The proper approach was that general statutory language applies to the State unless exempted expressly or by necessary implication.

Conclusion: The rule of Crown exemption did not continue as binding law in India after the Constitution and was not to be applied as a governing canon of construction.

Issue (ii): Whether the State was bound by section 218 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 to take out a licence for carrying on trade at the market and, if so, whether section 541 and the connected penal provisions excluded such liability by necessary implication.

Analysis: The majority held that section 218 was framed in general terms and contained no express exemption for the State. Section 541 was treated as a mode of recovery for the licence fee, and the provisions could be harmoniously read without implying an exemption. The possibility that imprisonment could not be imposed on the State did not compel exclusion, and the statutory scheme did not show any necessary implication that the State was outside the licence obligation.

Conclusion: The State was bound by section 218 and was not exempt by necessary implication; the conviction was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the State remained subject to the licensing requirement under the municipal law, and the statutory scheme did not justify an implied exemption.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinion: Shah, J. and Bachawat, J. differed on the constitutional survival of the rule and held that the State was bound by the Act on a fair construction, but their reasoning maintained the dismissal of the appeal. The dismissal was therefore supported by both the majority and the concurring result, though on different reasoning.

Ratio Decidendi: A general statute binds the State unless it is expressly or by necessary implication excluded, and a pre-Constitution rule of Crown exemption that is merely a canon of construction does not survive as binding law under Article 372.

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