Successor Magistrate cannot rely on predecessor's summary-trial record; mandatory bar makes the conviction unsustainable.

Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars a succeeding Magistrate from acting on evidence recorded by a predecessor in a summary trial, because only the substance of evidence is available and the successor cannot properly evaluate it from that record. The prohibition is mandatory, so consent of the parties cannot confer jurisdiction and the defect is one of competency, not a curable irregularity. The successor Magistrate could not validly proceed on the earlier summary-trial record, and the conviction based on those proceedings could not be sustained; a de novo retrial was required.

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Issues: Whether Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 bars a succeeding Magistrate from acting on evidence recorded by a predecessor in a summary trial and whether such defect can be cured by consent or under the provisions relating to irregularities.

Analysis: Section 326 enables a successor Magistrate to proceed on evidence recorded by a predecessor in ordinary trials, but sub-section (3) expressly excludes summary trials. In a summary trial, only the substance of evidence is recorded, and the successor Magistrate cannot properly assess the evidence merely from that record. The prohibition is mandatory, so the proceeding cannot be continued by the successor Magistrate on the earlier record. Consent of the parties cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists, and a trial conducted by a Magistrate not empowered to do so is void; the defect is one of competency, not a curable irregularity.

Conclusion: The successor Magistrate could not validly proceed on the predecessor's summary-trial record, and the matter required a de novo retrial. The conviction based on such proceedings could not be sustained.

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