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<h1>Higher solatium under Sections 23(2) and 30(2) upheld, but Section 23(1A) additional amount disallowed for land acquisition compensation</h1> SC partly allowed the acquiring authority's appeal concerning land acquisition compensation under the Amending Act 68 of 1984. Interpreting Section 30(2), ... Entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending Act - Applicability of section 23(IA) providing additional amount of compensation to award made in such acquisition proceedings - scope of retrospective operation of Section 23(2) - HELD THAT:- The plain meaning rule of interpreting Section 30(2) of the Amending Act 68 of 1984. But then, it would seem very odd indeed and anomalous too to exclude the present case from the operation of section 30(2). Section 30(2) is the Transitional Provisions. The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provisions in any Act or amendment is to clarify as to when and how the operative parts of the enactments are to take effect. The Transitional Provisions generally are intended to take care of the events during the period of transition. The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the Court decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the literal meaning of the statute, then the court must strike the balance. The criticism that the literal interpretation of Section 30(2), if adhered to would lead to unjust result seems to be justified. - If the award made after 24 September 1984, is not given higher solatium. Such a construction of Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided. We, therefore, hold that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the present case. This would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the purpose of Section 30(2). In this view of the matter, the higher solutium allowed by the High Court is kept undisturbed. Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30 April 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(IA) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30 April 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. - The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in section 30 sub-section (2). In the case before us, on 26 October 1967, the notification under section 4 was issued. On 5 March 1969 the Collec- tor made the award. The result is that on 30 April 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector. Therefore, section 30 sub-section (1)(a) is not attracted to the case. Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30 April 1982, section 30 sub-section (1)(b) is also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis. The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23( I-A). The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh [1985 (8) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT] appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the conclusion. But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology used in Section 30 sub-section (1) is quite similar to that used in Section 30 sub-section (2). The scope of those words has already been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh has been overruled in Raghubir Singh [1989 (5) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT]. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment of the High Court is modified and the compensation award under Section 23(IA) is deleted. The judgment and decree in other respects are kept undisturbed. ' In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Issues Involved:1. Applicability of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 for higher solatium.2. Applicability of Section 23(1A) for additional compensation.Summary:Issue 1: Applicability of Section 23(2) for Higher SolatiumThe primary question was whether Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984, providing for higher solatium, applies to awards made after 24 September 1984, even if the acquisition proceedings commenced before that date. The Court noted that Section 23(2) has limited retrospectivity through transitional provisions u/s 30(2). The Court referenced previous judgments, including Kamalajammaniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, which clarified that higher solatium applies only to awards made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984. However, the Court found that excluding cases like the present one from the benefit of higher solatium would lead to anomalies and potential constitutional issues under Article 14. Therefore, the Court held that the benefit of higher solatium should also be available to the present case, affirming the High Court's decision to grant 30% solatium.Issue 2: Applicability of Section 23(1A) for Additional CompensationThe second issue was whether the claimant is entitled to additional compensation u/s 23(1A). Section 23(1A) mandates an additional amount at 12% per annum on the market value of the land from the date of notification u/s 4(1) to the date of the award or possession. The Court examined the transitional provisions u/s 30(1)(a) and (b), which apply Section 23(1A) to acquisition proceedings pending as of 30 April 1982 or commenced after that date. Since the acquisition in this case commenced on 26 October 1967 and the award was made on 5 March 1969, the proceedings were not pending before the Collector as of 30 April 1982. Therefore, Section 30(1)(a) and (b) did not apply, and the claimant was not entitled to additional compensation u/s 23(1A).Conclusion:The appeal was allowed in part. The judgment of the High Court was modified to delete the compensation awarded u/s 23(1A), while the rest of the judgment and decree were kept undisturbed. No order as to costs was made.