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Issues: (i) whether the 1960 amendment, by restricting the protection of non-residential buildings to specified towns, violated Article 14 of the Constitution; (ii) whether the amendment infringed Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) by withdrawing rights said to have been acquired under the earlier tenancy protection law.
Issue (i): whether the 1960 amendment, by restricting the protection of non-residential buildings to specified towns, violated Article 14 of the Constitution.
Analysis: The validity of a classification depends on an intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object of the legislation. The protection conferred by the earlier law extended to residential and non-residential buildings, but the 1960 amendment confined non-residential protection to Madras and certain commercially important towns. The materials placed before the Court showed that the preferred towns were larger commercial and industrial centres, with a greater concentration of non-residential tenancies and heavier pressure on such premises. The classification was therefore not arbitrary.
Conclusion: The amendment did not offend Article 14 and the classification was valid.
Issue (ii): whether the amendment infringed Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) by withdrawing rights said to have been acquired under the earlier tenancy protection law.
Analysis: Article 19(1)(f) was held to protect both abstract and concrete rights of property, and a law depriving a person of property must still be a valid law and satisfy constitutional limitations. However, the statutory right to apply for purchase of the land under section 9 was not itself a right of property. The right was only to seek a compulsory sale of the land and did not create an interest in the property or extend to the superstructure. Since the amendment only withdrew that statutory privilege in relation to certain areas, it did not deprive the appellants of a protected property right.
Conclusion: The amendment did not infringe Articles 19(1)(f) or 31(1).
Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge failed, and the appellants were not entitled to insist that their section 9 applications be decided under the unamended law.
Ratio Decidendi: A territorial classification in a welfare statute is valid if supported by real differences bearing a rational nexus to the legislative object, and a statutory right to seek purchase of land does not, by itself, amount to a right of property.