Involuntary confession and no Section 123 presumption left the customs penalty unsupported by sufficient proof.

A confession recorded after overnight retention at the Customs House was treated as involuntary because the surrounding circumstances showed de facto detention and pressure, so it could not be relied upon. The presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act did not apply because the gold bars were recovered from a buried place in the backyard of the house, not from possession in the statutory sense. With the statement excluded and the presumption unavailable, the remaining evidence, including an accomplice statement, was insufficient to prove conscious possession or sustain the penalty; suspicion could not replace proof.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's inculpatory statement was voluntary and could be relied upon; (ii) whether the statutory presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied to the recovery of gold bars from the backyard of the appellant's house; (iii) whether the remaining evidence, including the statement of the alleged accomplice, was sufficient to sustain the penalty.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's inculpatory statement was voluntary and could be relied upon.

Analysis: The statement was recorded after the appellant had been kept in the Customs House overnight and for a substantial part of the next morning. The surrounding circumstances indicated de facto detention and pressure rather than free and voluntary disclosure. A statement obtained in such circumstances cannot be treated as voluntary, and the fact that it contained details does not cure the defect if the foundation of voluntariness is missing.

Conclusion: The inculpatory statement was not voluntary and was rightly rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied to the recovery of gold bars from the backyard of the appellant's house.

Analysis: Section 123 fastens a presumption only where notified goods are recovered from a person's possession. Recovery from a buried place in the backyard or residential compound was not treated as recovery from possession in the strict statutory sense. The Court declined to expand the meaning of possession to include such a recovery.

Conclusion: The presumption under Section 123 was inapplicable.

Issue (iii): Whether the remaining evidence, including the statement of the alleged accomplice, was sufficient to sustain the penalty.

Analysis: Once the appellant's statement was excluded and the statutory presumption was held inapplicable, the case rested on limited corroborative material and the statement of an alleged accomplice. That material was treated as insufficient to establish conscious possession or culpability beyond suspicion. Suspicion, however strong, could not substitute for proof in adjudication.

Conclusion: The evidence was insufficient to sustain the penalty.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication failed on both the admissibility of the appellant's statement and the inapplicability of the statutory presumption, leaving the Department without sufficient proof to uphold the confiscatory and penal findings.

Ratio Decidendi: A confession obtained during de facto detention is not voluntary and cannot be relied upon, and the presumption attached to notified goods under Section 123 applies only to recovery from possession in the statutory sense.

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