Detention under tax law requires recorded statutory satisfaction and independent discretion; orders issued on superior instructions are invalid.

Detention of a goods vehicle under section 29(6) of the A.P.G.S.T. Act was held invalid because the original order did not record the statutory satisfaction required for detention to prevent tax evasion. A reference to an alleged telephonic communication about arrears was insufficient, and fresh grounds introduced in the counter-affidavit could not cure the defect. The order was also vitiated because the statutory authority acted under dictation of superior officers rather than exercising independent discretion. The writ petition was therefore allowed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the detention of the goods vehicle was valid under sub-section (6) of section 29 of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, 1957 in the absence of the statutory preconditions for detention; (ii) Whether the detention order was vitiated because the authority acted under dictation of superior officers.

Issue (i): Whether the detention of the goods vehicle was valid under sub-section (6) of section 29 of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, 1957 in the absence of the statutory preconditions for detention.

Analysis: The power of detention could be exercised only when the statutory authority, after making such enquiry as it deemed fit, was satisfied that detention was necessary to prevent evasion of tax payable in respect of the goods carried. The recorded order referred only to an alleged telephonic communication regarding arrears and did not disclose the satisfaction required by the provision. Fresh grounds introduced in the counter-affidavit could not cure the defect in the original order.

Conclusion: The detention was not supported by the statutory conditions and was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the detention order was vitiated because the authority acted under dictation of superior officers.

Analysis: The authority who is the statutory repository of power had to exercise that power independently. The impugned order itself showed that the detention was made pursuant to instructions from higher officers, and the decision-making discretion was not exercised by the authority on its own judgment.

Conclusion: The order was vitiated as it was passed under dictation and not by an independent exercise of statutory discretion.

Final Conclusion: The detention order could not be sustained and the writ petition was allowed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A detention order under section 29(6) of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, 1957 must rest on the statutory satisfaction expressly recorded in the order itself and must be the product of an independent exercise of discretion; it cannot be justified by later affidavits or by directions from superiors.

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