Partner not an employee under EPF law, and accrued infancy benefit cannot be cut off without clear retrospective intent.

A partner working in a firm is not an employee for EPF purposes because a partner stands in the position of an employer, and that status is not altered by participation in the business or receipt of remuneration. The deletion of the infancy period under Section 16(1)(d) did not retrospectively curtail an infancy benefit already available to an existing establishment, as accrued statutory protection is not taken away absent clear retrospective intent. On those principles, the impugned order could not stand and was set aside, with the matter remanded for fresh decision after hearing the petitioners.

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Issues: (i) Whether a partner working in the firm can be treated as an employee for the purposes of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; (ii) Whether an amendment deleting the infancy period under Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 could retrospectively curtail the infancy benefit already available to an existing establishment.

Issue (i): Whether a partner working in the firm can be treated as an employee for the purposes of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Analysis: A partner occupies the legal position of an employer in relation to the firm and does not acquire the character of an employee merely because he may work in the business or receive remuneration. The distinction between a partner and an employee is fundamental and the benefit-oriented approach cannot override that status.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the respondent and in favour of the petitioners; a partner could not be treated as an employee.

Issue (ii): Whether an amendment deleting the infancy period under Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 could retrospectively curtail the infancy benefit already available to an existing establishment.

Analysis: The infancy period operates for the benefit of the establishment from the date of its commencement, and once that benefit accrues under the unamended provision, a later amendment does not take it away unless the amendment is made retrospective in clear terms. The deletion of the infancy period did not show any retrospective intent and could not defeat the benefit already attaching to establishments in existence when the period commenced.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the petitioners; the already accrued infancy period could not be curtailed by the amendment.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand and was set aside, with the matter sent back for fresh decision after hearing the petitioners in light of the stated principles.

Ratio Decidendi: A partner is not an employee of the firm, and an amendment withdrawing a statutory infancy benefit does not operate retrospectively to deprive an existing establishment of the benefit already accrued to it absent clear legislative intent.

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