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Issues: (i) whether an appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal recorded by the Special Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949; (ii) whether the special procedure and trial offended Article 14 of the Constitution; and (iii) whether the convictions were hit by Article 20 of the Constitution as convictions under an ex post facto law, including in relation to the offence alleged to have been committed outside Vindhya Pradesh.
Issue (i): whether an appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal recorded by the Special Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949
Analysis: The Ordinance provided that the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted and so far as not inconsistent with the Ordinance, would apply to Special Court proceedings, and that the Special Judge would be deemed to be a Court of Session. The appellate provisions of the Code applicable to Courts of Session were therefore attracted. The construction that denied any appeal would render the deeming provision and the appellate scheme ineffective.
Conclusion: The appeal to the Judicial Commissioner was competent, and the objection to maintainability failed.
Issue (ii): whether the special procedure and trial offended Article 14 of the Constitution
Analysis: The challenge under Article 14 depended on showing material prejudice or arbitrary discrimination arising from the continued application of the special procedure. The Court found that the criminal procedure position in the State had already been altered before the trial by prior adaptation measures, and the later saving provision preserved pending proceedings without creating inter se discrimination among similarly situated persons.
Conclusion: No infringement of Article 14 was made out.
Issue (iii): whether the convictions were hit by Article 20 of the Constitution as convictions under an ex post facto law, including in relation to the offence alleged to have been committed outside Vindhya Pradesh
Analysis: Article 20 was construed as prohibiting conviction or punishment for an offence under a law not in force in fact at the time of the act, and the expression "law in force" was understood as the law actually operating then, not a law only deemed to be in force by later retrospective enactment. The Court further held that the relevant substantive penal law in the area was already substantially the same before the impugned Ordinance, that the Rajpramukh had authority to adapt and continue the existing criminal law, and that the State had competence to regulate extraterritorial offences by its own subjects. The later ordinance was treated as an adaptation of an already operative legal position rather than the creation of a new offence. Changes in criminal procedure did not attract Article 20.
Conclusion: The objection under Article 20 was unsustainable, including for the extraterritorial charge.
Final Conclusion: The preliminary and constitutional objections were rejected, the competence of the appeal and the validity of the trial and convictions were upheld, and the matter was directed to proceed to hearing on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi: A court may derive appellate jurisdiction from a statutory deeming of the trial court as a Court of Session read with the Code's appellate provisions, and Article 20 bars conviction only where the offence was not punishable under the law actually in force at the time of the act, not merely where the law was later retrospectively adapted or continued.