1961 (4) TMI 82 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court protects appellants from eviction under Section 12(1) - Appeal allowed

SHAH BHOJRAJ KUVERJI OIL MILLS AND GINNING FACTORY Versus SUBBASH CHANDRA YOGRAJ SINHA

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Section 12(1) of the Act applied to the pending suit, protecting the appellants from eviction. The ... Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? Whether the plaintiff’s suit for possession of the suit property is maintainable in view of the Notification issued by the Government of Bombay on 16th August, 1958, applying Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act? If not, what order should be passed? Held that:- The appeal is allowed, and the two preliminary Issues are answered in favour of the appellants. Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit.2. Maintainability of the suit for possession in light of the notification applying Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.3. Application and retrospective effect of Section 12 of the Act to pending cases.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit:The Civil Judge framed a preliminary issue to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to try the suit. This issue was decided against the appellants, and the High Court of Bombay upheld this decision. The Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue in detail in its judgment, implying that the jurisdiction was not a primary point of contention in the appeal.2. Maintainability of the suit for possession in light of the notification applying Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947:The appellants argued that the suit for possession was not maintainable due to the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act, which applied Part II of the Act to the area where the property is situated. The Civil Judge and the High Court decided against the appellants, relying on the Full Bench ruling in Nilkanth Ramachandra v. Rasiktal and the Supreme Court decision in Chandrasingh Manibhai v. Surjit Lal Sadhamal Chhabda, which held that Section 12 of the Act was prospective and did not apply to pending cases.3. Application and retrospective effect of Section 12 of the Act to pending cases:The appellants contended that by virtue of the first proviso to Section 50 of the Act, all provisions of Part II, including Section 12, were made applicable to all suits, including pending ones. They argued that Section 12(1) of the Act, which prevents landlords from recovering possession if the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent, should apply retrospectively to their case.The Supreme Court examined the relevant provisions of the Act, including the first proviso to Section 50 and Section 12. The Court noted that the first proviso to Section 50 provided that all suits and proceedings pending in any court would be transferred to and continued before the courts designated under the Act, and all provisions of the Act would apply to such suits and proceedings. However, the Court found it unnecessary to decide on the retrospective application of the proviso due to its decision on the second point.The Supreme Court held that Section 12(1) of the Act, which enacts a rule of decision that a landlord is not entitled to possession if the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent, applied from the date the Act was extended to the area in question. The Court emphasized that Section 12(1) should be interpreted as a rule of decision applicable at the time of passing the decree for possession, making it applicable to both pending and future suits. The Court concluded that the appellants, as statutory tenants, were protected under Section 12(1) and that the landlord was not entitled to possession.The Supreme Court noted that previous decisions of the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court, which held Section 12 to be prospective, were concerned with subsections (2) and (3) of Section 12, which were clearly prospective. The Court clarified that Section 12(1) was not considered in those decisions and that its language applied equally to pending suits when Part II came into force.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Section 12(1) of the Act applied to the pending suit, protecting the appellants from eviction. The Court set aside the decisions of the High Court and the Civil Judge, and directed that the suit be decided in conformity with its judgment. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the Supreme Court and the High Court.Appeal allowed.