Special statutory procedure for sand vehicle seizure prevails over criminal procedure, and Division Bench rulings remain binding on Single Judges.

A special statutory procedure under the Sand Act and Rules governs seizure, objection, release, and disposal of vehicles used for illegal sand transport, so the general procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure does not control interim custody. On that construction, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order release on the basis urged by the petitioners. The text also states that Division Bench rulings remain binding on a Single Judge unless displaced by a larger Bench, the Supreme Court, or legislative change, and that a stay in another proceeding does not remove their precedential force. Judicial discipline therefore requires adherence to those rulings or a reference if disagreement persists.

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Issues: (i) Whether, on seizure of a vehicle for illegal transport of sand under the Sand Act and Rules, the seizure and subsequent release of the vehicle are governed by the special statutory procedure or by the Code of Criminal Procedure. (ii) Whether a learned Single Judge could ignore earlier Division Bench decisions on the ground that one of them was stayed, and whether judicial discipline required adherence to those decisions.

Issue (i): Whether, on seizure of a vehicle for illegal transport of sand under the Sand Act and Rules, the seizure and subsequent release of the vehicle are governed by the special statutory procedure or by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats offences under the Sand Act as cognizable, but it also prescribes a special procedure for seizure, objection, consideration by the District Collector, payment of the amount fixed, and auction in default. The provisions of the Act and the Rules were read together as a complete code for seizure and disposal of the vehicle. On that construction, seizure is not to be treated as one under the general criminal procedure, and there is no requirement to file a report before the Magistrate for release of the vehicle under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Conclusion: The special procedure under the Sand Act and Rules governs seizure and release, and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to deal with interim custody on the basis suggested by the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether a learned Single Judge could ignore earlier Division Bench decisions on the ground that one of them was stayed, and whether judicial discipline required adherence to those decisions.

Analysis: The law declared by a Division Bench remains binding on a Single Judge unless it is overruled by a larger Bench, the Supreme Court, or legislative change. A stay of the judgment in another proceeding does not erase its precedential force. The hierarchy of courts, certainty of law, and judicial propriety require a Single Judge to follow the existing Division Bench rulings and, if disagreement persists, to make a reference rather than depart from them.

Conclusion: The earlier Division Bench decisions were binding and could not be disregarded by a Single Judge merely because one of them was stayed.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered in favour of the view that the Sand Act and Rules provide the governing procedure, that the earlier Division Bench rulings continue to bind Single Judges, and that the individual writ petitions were to proceed separately on their own merits before the appropriate Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute lays down a complete procedure for seizure and disposal of property, that procedure prevails over the general criminal procedure; and a Single Judge must follow a binding Division Bench decision unless it is displaced by a larger Bench, the Supreme Court, or statute.

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