Service tax on chartered accountants' professional services upheld as a valid fiscal levy distinct from the right to practise.

Parliament had legislative competence to levy service tax on taxable services rendered by practising chartered accountants because the levy was on the value of professional services, not on the privilege of practising the profession; the aspects doctrine and pith-and-substance test placed it outside Entry 60 of List II, and it was upheld under the residuary power. The levy was not discriminatory under Article 14, as taxation allows rational classification and exemptions do not invalidate the underlying charge. It also did not unreasonably restrict the right to practise under Article 19(1)(g), since a valid fiscal levy is not by itself unconstitutional. The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 did not control the fiscal definition in the Finance Act.

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Issues: (i) Whether Parliament had legislative competence to levy service tax on taxable services rendered by practising chartered accountants; (ii) whether the levy was discriminatory and violative of Article 14; (iii) whether the levy unreasonably restricted the right to practise a profession under Article 19(1)(g); and (iv) whether the challenge based on the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, displaced the validity of the levy.

Issue (i): Whether Parliament had legislative competence to levy service tax on taxable services rendered by practising chartered accountants.

Analysis: Legislative competence had to be tested by the pith and substance of the levy and by applying the aspects doctrine. The tax was not on the privilege of entering or remaining in a profession, which would fall within Entry 60 of List II, but on the value of the professional service rendered. The taxable event was the rendering of service for consideration, while the profession and the income arising from it were distinct aspects capable of separate fiscal treatment. No entry in List II covered service tax as such, and Parliament could therefore legislate under its residuary power.

Conclusion: The levy was within the legislative competence of Parliament and not beyond competence under Entry 60 of List II.

Issue (ii): Whether the levy was discriminatory and violative of Article 14.

Analysis: In taxation matters, the Legislature has wide latitude in classification, and differential treatment is permissible if it is based on a rational distinction having nexus with the object of the levy. The fact that only some professional services were brought within the tax net, while others were exempted or not yet covered, did not by itself establish hostile discrimination. Exemption provisions do not negate the underlying levy; they only suspend its operation to the extent provided.

Conclusion: The levy did not violate Article 14.

Issue (iii): Whether the levy unreasonably restricted the right to practise a profession under Article 19(1)(g).

Analysis: A valid fiscal levy, by itself, is not an unreasonable restriction on the right to practise a profession. The tax was modest in rate and formed part of a legitimate economic and revenue measure. Courts accord greater deference to economic legislation and do not strike it down merely because it may have incidence on professional activity.

Conclusion: The levy did not infringe Article 19(1)(g).

Issue (iv): Whether the definitions and regulatory scheme under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, invalidated the levy.

Analysis: The meaning of the expressions used in the Finance Act had to be gathered from that Act itself. The scheme of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, could not control the fiscal definition of practising chartered accountant in the Finance Act. The distinction between membership, practice, and the fiscal incidence of service tax did not render the levy unconstitutional.

Conclusion: The challenge based on the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, failed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned service tax on professional services rendered by practising chartered accountants was upheld as constitutionally valid, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax on the value of professional services rendered is distinct from a tax on the privilege of practising a profession, and where no entry in the State List covers that fiscal aspect, Parliament may impose the levy under its residuary power.

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