Arbitral procedure and writ jurisdiction: tribunal may extend claim-filing time, and section 25(a) does not compel automatic termination.

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 operates as a self-contained code for arbitral procedure and jurisdictional objections, so writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not maintainable where the statute provides an effective inbuilt remedy. Procedural timelines under sections 18, 19, 23, 25 and 32 must be read harmoniously with the tribunal's duty to ensure equal treatment and a full opportunity to present the case. On that basis, section 25(a) was construed in context as not requiring automatic termination for delay in filing the statement of claim, and the arbitral tribunal was treated as competent to grant a reasonable extension of time.

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Issues: Whether a writ petition was maintainable against an arbitral tribunal's procedural order when the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provided an inbuilt remedy on jurisdictional objections; and whether, under section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal was bound to terminate the proceedings for the claimant's failure to file the statement of claim within time or could extend time.

Analysis: The Act is a self-contained code governing arbitral procedure and jurisdictional objections. Where the statute itself enables the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and the party has an effective statutory remedy, recourse to writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily maintainable. On the procedural question, sections 18, 19, 23, 25 and 32 were read together. Section 18 requires equal treatment and full opportunity to present the case; section 19 permits party-agreed procedure, and failing agreement, procedure fixed by the tribunal; section 23 contemplates filing of claim and defence within the agreed or tribunal-determined time. Section 25(a), though couched in mandatory language, was construed in context as not excluding a reasonable extension of time by the tribunal, particularly where such extension advances fairness and does not defeat the object of the Act. A rigid construction making termination automatic for every delay would conflict with the scheme of equal opportunity and fair procedure.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable on the facts, and the arbitral tribunal was held competent to extend time for filing the statement of claim. Section 25(a) was treated as directory in the context of the case, not as compelling automatic termination in every instance of delay.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the arbitral tribunal's order failed, and the arbitration was permitted to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: In the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, procedural provisions governing filing timelines must be construed harmoniously with the tribunal's duty to ensure equality and a fair opportunity to present the case, and section 25(a) does not mandate automatic termination where a reasonable extension of time is granted in the exercise of procedural control.

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