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Issues: (i) Whether a consent order passed in winding-up proceedings, by which the company admitted liability and the managing director guaranteed performance, could be treated as an executable order having the force of a decree and as the basis for insolvency proceedings against the guarantor. (ii) Whether the company court had power, while dealing with a winding-up petition, to pass an order directing payment of an admitted debt to the petitioning creditor.
Issue (i): Whether a consent order passed in winding-up proceedings, by which the company admitted liability and the managing director guaranteed performance, could be treated as an executable order having the force of a decree and as the basis for insolvency proceedings against the guarantor.
Analysis: The consent terms were read as a whole. The order recorded the company's admission of liability, directed payment of the admitted amount by instalments, and required the managing director to guarantee payment and stand surety for performance of the terms. Section 634 of the Companies Act, 1956 was construed as conferring on such an order the same enforceability as a decree. On that footing, the guarantee undertaken by the managing director was held to be capable of execution under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the order therefore answered the description of a decree or order for payment of money for purposes of section 9 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.
Conclusion: Yes. The consent order was executable in the manner of a decree, and insolvency notice could be founded on it against the respondent.
Issue (ii): Whether the company court had power, while dealing with a winding-up petition, to pass an order directing payment of an admitted debt to the petitioning creditor.
Analysis: Section 443 of the Companies Act, 1956, read with the inherent powers preserved by the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, was held to be wide enough to permit an appropriate order other than winding up itself. The court distinguished cases where liability was disputed and stressed that, where liability was admitted and the company had consented to pay, the court was not barred from making an order for payment. The earlier authorities were treated as supporting the proposition that a winding-up petition is a proper remedy for enforcement of a just debt and that an order of payment made in such proceedings is executable like a decree. The court also rejected the objections based on fraudulent preference and the supposed absence of jurisdiction to make such an order.
Conclusion: Yes. The company court had jurisdiction to direct payment of the admitted amount to the petitioning creditor, and such order had the force of a decree.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the respondent was held liable to face insolvency proceedings on the strength of the consent order passed in the winding-up matter.
Ratio Decidendi: A consent order in winding-up proceedings, recording an admitted liability and a guarantee for performance, may be enforced as an executable order having the force of a decree, and the company court has power to direct payment of an admitted debt to a petitioning creditor in aid of that process.