Writ jurisdiction limits on disturbing factual findings where evidence supports seizure-related conclusions and no perversity is shown.

A writ court should not overturn a supported factual finding unless it is unsupported by evidence or so perverse that no reasonable person could reach it. Here, the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion that the seized goods were not being transported to the city booking agency rested on several circumstances, including the absence of supporting documents, octroi payment, the manner of transport, and material from railway officials. The High Court interfered without addressing all the reasons underlying that finding. The Supreme Court held that such interference was unjustified and that the factual finding should have been left undisturbed.

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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in interfering in writ jurisdiction with the Deputy Commissioner's factual finding that the seized goods were not being transported to the city booking agency and were therefore liable to seizure.

Analysis: The Deputy Commissioner had recorded a factual finding on the basis of several circumstances, including the absence of supporting documents, the octroi payment, the manner of transport, and the material produced by the railway officials. The High Court interfered without dealing with all the reasons on which that finding rested. A writ court does not substitute its own view for a factual finding unless the finding is unsupported by evidence or is perverse, namely one that no reasonable person would reach. The finding here was not shown to be of that character.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in setting aside the factual finding in writ jurisdiction, and its judgment on that aspect was liable to be set aside.

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