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The criminal justice system rests not merely on the ability of courts to punish the guilty, but on their constitutional obligation to ensure that punishment is imposed only through a process that is just, fair, and reasonable. A recent judgment of the Kerala High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 740 of 2020 decided on 12 January 2026 offers a stark reminder that when procedure itself degenerates into punishment, the legitimacy of the conviction collapses, irrespective of the gravity of the charge.
The appeal arose from a conviction under Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code relating to a stabbing incident during an Onam celebration in September 2011. The Sessions Court had sentenced the accused to imprisonment for life. By the time the High Court examined the matter, the accused had already spent nearly fourteen years in custody, including more than seven years as an under-trial prisoner. The challenge before the appellate court was not confined to evidentiary appreciation, but went to the root of constitutional compliance in criminal adjudication.
The High Court undertook a meticulous examination of the trial record, order sheets, and procedural history. What emerged was not an isolated irregularity but a pattern of systemic failure that cumulatively resulted in a denial of fair trial guaranteed under Articles 21, 22 and 39A of the Constitution of India. The Court’s analysis demonstrates how constitutional violations often occur not through a single dramatic illegality, but through sustained neglect of procedural safeguards.
A central feature of the case was the absence of effective legal representation. Though the accused was initially represented by counsel, the vakalat was relinquished midway, and for a substantial portion of the trial the accused was left to fend for himself. Crucially, the most material witnesses, including injured eyewitnesses, were cross-examined by the accused personally. The High Court rightly noted that the right to defend oneself is not illusory, and that an untrained layperson conducting cross-examination in a sessions trial involving a charge of murder cannot be equated with meaningful legal defence. The constitutional mandate is not merely to offer legal aid, but to ensure that such aid is effective and competent. The Court drew strength from a long line of Supreme Court precedents, including Hussainara Khatoon, Khatri, Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali, and the recent decision in Ashok v. State of U.P., all of which affirm that ineffective legal assistance is tantamount to denial of fair trial.
Equally disturbing was the manner in which evidence was recorded. The High Court found, on the basis of the proceedings sheet itself, that several prosecution witnesses were examined in the absence of the accused, who remained in judicial custody and was not produced before court on those dates. This was held to be a direct violation of Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the accused unless lawfully exempted. The Court reiterated that the presence of the accused during evidence is not a procedural technicality but a substantive safeguard, enabling effective defence and ensuring transparency of trial.
The judgment also records an extraordinary departure from prosecutorial norms. In several instances, prosecution witnesses were examined in the absence of the Public Prosecutor, and the Sessions Judge herself conducted what amounted to chief-examination. While Section 165 of the Evidence Act empowers a judge to put questions to elicit truth, the High Court emphasized that this power cannot be stretched to permit the court to assume the role of the prosecutor. Such role confusion, the Court observed, destroys the structural neutrality of a criminal trial and undermines both prosecution and defence.
Another constitutional dimension addressed by the Court was delay. After the framing of charge, the trial dragged on for nearly five years, marked by repeated adjournments, rescheduling, and long gaps in recording evidence. The accused remained in custody throughout. Referring to Section 309 CrPC and authoritative Supreme Court rulings on speedy trial, the Court held that a prolonged, piecemeal trial, particularly in a custodial case, violates the right to speedy justice implicit in Article 21. The explanation that other “targeted cases” were being prioritised was found to be wholly untenable when weighed against the liberty of an under-trial prisoner.
Having found that the trial was vitiated by multiple constitutional and procedural violations, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence. Importantly, the Court declined to order a de novo trial, noting that the incident was of 2011 vintage and the accused had already suffered incarceration for fourteen years. To direct a fresh trial at that stage, the Court held, would itself be unjust and unreasonable. The accused was accordingly directed to be released forthwith, and the fine, if paid, was ordered to be refunded. Recognising the institutional significance of the lapses, the Court also directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Kerala Judicial Academy for guidance of Sessions Judges.
This judgment is significant beyond the confines of criminal law. It reinforces a foundational principle that resonates across adjudicatory regimes, including tax and fiscal jurisprudence: that authority without procedure is arbitrariness, and procedure without fairness is oppression. Whether in criminal prosecution, tax adjudication, or regulatory enforcement, the legitimacy of the outcome is inseparable from the fairness of the process. When courts or authorities prioritise targets, statistics, or expediency over due process, the law itself becomes the casualty.
The Kerala High Court’s decision stands as a constitutional corrective, reminding all adjudicating authorities that procedure is not a mere handmaiden of justice but its very bloodstream. Punishment imposed through an unfair process ceases to be justice and becomes institutionalised injustice.